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Abstract:  The purpose of this mixed methods study was the identification of common 
errors, causal factors and corrective actions related to maintenance errors affecting 
aircraft with more than 70 seats and operated by major U.S. air carriers.  FAA 
compliance action letters obtained by FOIA for American Airlines, Southwest Airlines, 
and United Airlines were examined to identify errors and causal elements for 
categorization and further study.  Delta Air Lines letters were requested but not provided 
by the FAA.  Participants were randomly selected from FAA listings of certificated 
mechanics and asked to complete a survey.  Quantitative data was acquired from 48 
participants that met selection criteria and completed the survey.  Qualitative data was 
acquired from interviews conducted with nine of the survey participants.  Using the 
categories developed from the FAA data, the study found common errors with the 
completion of maintenance entries, handling of maintenance documents, content of 
maintenance instructions, installation of parts, deviations from maintenance procedures, 
and maintenance steps or tasks that were overlooked or not performed.  Dominant causal 
factors were identified as failure to follow instructions or procedural requirements, and 
maintenance and process instructions that contain inaccurate information or lacked 
sufficient detail.  The dominate human factors identified in the study were complacency 
and lack of attention.  Study participants noted that complacency was primarily 
responsible for failure to follow instructions.  Performance of repetitive or simple tasks 
was a causal factor that drove complacency.  Direct or indirect demands on mechanics to 
quickly return aircraft to service also contributed to the performance of maintenance 
without the use of instructions.  Significant corrective actions taken by air carriers 
included the imposition of controls to prevent the release of flight plans for aircraft that 
have overdue inspection items, improvements to allow for greater access to maintenance 
manuals, and a program for the review of instructions by maintenance personnel prior to 
publication.  Suggested corrective actions include automation of manual processes used 
to track recurring inspections, improved drafting of instructions with mechanic 
involvement, improved training of new mechanics to instill good habits and providing 
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The operation and maintenance of large commercial passenger aircraft is prone to 
errors that can have devastating consequences.  These consequences can include the loss 
of aircraft, injuries, or even fatal outcomes to aircraft occupants or those on the ground.  
Errors committed by flight crews operating passenger aircraft tend to receive much 
attention by the public and investigators.  However, flight operations are just one 
operational segment wherein errors can be committed.  Ground operations and aircraft 
maintenance comprise other operational segments that are prone to errors.  Aircraft 
maintenance is susceptible to the commission of errors due to the multitude of 
maintenance tasks which typically require technicians to remove and replace parts in 
confined spaces and who are often under time constraints to return aircraft to service 
(Reason & Hobbs, 2003). 
Aircraft maintenance is not only costly for air carriers but errors committed by 
maintenance personnel can further impact airlines through operational delays or accidents 
(Kanki & Hobbs, 2008).  Maintenance errors committed by aircraft maintenance 
personnel have been determined to be responsible for 12 to 15 percent of all aircraft 
accidents and incidents (Rashid, Place & Braithwaite, 2014).  Human factors are 
recognized as causal factors that lead to the commission of errors and they have been 
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identified as the root cause of 80 to 90 percent of all aircraft accidents (Erjavac, 
Iammartino, & Fossaceca, 2018; Shanmugam & Robert, 2015).  Human factors can affect 
aviation maintenance at different stages of the maintenance process and can impact 
planning, training, aircraft facilities, test equipment, engineering, maintenance 
instructions, documentation, inspection, and management (Shanmugam & Robert, 2015).  
Errors can also be repetitive.  A 1997 study conducted by Alan Hobbs who interviewed 
aircraft technicians noted 86 safety related incidents of which over half were of a type 
that had previously occurred (Reason & Hobbs, 2003). 
Although it is evident that human factors play a key role in the commission of 
maintenance errors, identification of repetitive maintenance errors shared in common by 
commercial passenger air carriers is of importance.  The identification of these errors and 
their causal factors would help determine what proactive efforts are required to eliminate 
or reduce the occurrence of such errors which in turn would enhance the safety of aircraft 
operated by air carriers. 
Statement of the Problem 
Research conducted on aircraft maintenance errors related to United States (U.S.) 
registered commercial aircraft has predominantly been reactive utilizing statistical data 
available from the NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS) and reports 
published by the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) (Erjavac, et al., 2018; 
Lattanzio, Patankar, & Kanki, 2008).  In 2010, proactive research focused on the use of 
maintenance instructions was conducted by Liang, Lin, Hwang, Wang, and Patterson 
using an on-line maintenance assistance platform providing visual instructions as a 
supplement to traditional printed maintenance instructions.  Both reactive and proactive 
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research provide conclusive evidence that a variety of factors affect the commission of 
maintenance errors but the research does not identify the most common maintenance 
errors shared by U.S. air carriers or actions that could be collectively undertaken by the 
industry to prevent those errors.  Because of the lack of recent information specific to 
maintenance performed on aircraft operated by U.S. air carriers, additional research is 
required to identify the most common types of maintenance errors shared by these air 
carriers to determine the causal factors that drive the commission of these errors. 
Purpose of the Study 
The purpose of this study is to identify and analyze maintenance errors that are 
committed by major U.S. certificated air carriers with the intent of identifying and 
categorizing common errors, the causal factors that led to the commission of these errors, 
and corrective action measures to mitigate the errors. 
Research Questions 
Given the significance that maintenance errors have on the U.S. airline industry, 
three research questions were proposed for this mixed methods study: 
1. What errors are common to maintenance performed on aircraft operated by 
major U.S. air carriers certificated under FAR Part 121? 
2. Why are these maintenance errors committed? 
3. What actions have been or could be instituted to prevent the commission of 
maintenance errors on aircraft operated by major U.S. air carriers? 
Definitions of Terms 
The following definitions are provided to help readers understand the meaning of 
certain terminology associated with this study. 
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Accident – “An occurrence associated with the operation of an aircraft which 
takes place between the time any person boards the aircraft with the intention of flight 
and all such persons have disembarked, and in which any person suffers death or serious 
injury, or in which the aircraft receives substantial damage” (National Transportation 
Safety Board, 2010). 
Causal Factor - “A major unplanned, unintended contributor to an incident (a 
negative event or undesirable condition), that if eliminated would have either prevented 
the occurrence of the incident or reduced its severity or frequency. Also known as a 
critical causal factor or contributing cause” (Causal Factor, n.d.). 
Contributing Factor - “Anything that affects how a maintenance technician or 
inspector does his/her job” (Boeing, 2013, p. 4). 
Error - “The failure of planned actions to achieve their desired goal, where this 
occurs without some unforeseeable or chance intervention” (Reason and Hobbs, 2003, 
p.39). 
Human Error - “Any human action or inaction that exceeds the tolerances defined 
by the system with which the human interacts” (as cited in Latorella and Prabhu, 2000, 
p.134). 
Incident - “An occurrence other than an accident, associated with the operation of 
an aircraft, which affects or could affect the safety of operations” (National 
Transportation Safety Board, 2010). 
Violation - “A human action (or human behavior) that intentionally deviates from 
the expected action (or behavior)” (Boeing, 2013, p.2). 
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The following acronyms are provided to help readers understand the meaning of 
certain terminology associated with this study. 
A&P: Airframe and Powerplant 
AMM: Aircraft Maintenance Manual 
AMT: Aviation Maintenance Technician 
ASAP: Aviation Safety Action Program 
ASM: Air Seat Mile 
ASRS: Aviation Safety Reporting System 
BOW: Bill of Work 
CA: Compliance Action 
CMO: Certificate Management Office 
DCT: Data Collection Tool 
EDA: Element Design Assessment 
EPA: Element Performance Assessment 
ETOPS: Extended Twin-engine Operations Performance Standards 
FAA: Federal Aviation Administration 
FIM: Fault Isolation Manual 
FOIA: Freedom of Information Act 
FSIMS: Flight Standards Information Management System 
HL: Hazard letter 
IPC: Illustrated Parts Catalog 
LOI: Letter of Investigation 
MEDA: Maintenance Error and Decision Aid  
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MEL: Minimum Equipment List 
MOR: Mandatory Occurrence Report 
OEM: Original Equipment Manufacturer 
PAH: Production Approval Holder 
ROI: Record of Inspection 
SAS: Safety Assurance System 
SPA: System Performance Assessment 
USPS: United States Postal Service 
VDRP: Voluntary Disclosure Reporting Program 
Significance of the Study 
This mixed methods study focuses on the identification of maintenance errors that are 
common to major U.S. certificated passenger air carriers.  Air travel has become 
commonplace for the public who expect aircraft to be maintained to the highest 
standards.  Mistakes that are made during the maintenance process can be costly to the air 
carriers and pose safety hazards for passengers and crew members.  Understanding these 
maintenance errors and the causal factors that drive them can support proactive measures 
to prevent the recurrence of the errors.  Comparison of common errors within the U.S. air 
carrier industry can aid in the prioritization of these proactive measures in effort to reduce 
or eliminate the errors.  This study provides information that can be used to recognize 
common maintenance errors and causal factors within the air carrier industry so that 
action can be taken to avoid consequences that affect airworthiness of the aircraft and 





The following assumptions are made for this study: 
1. The participants selected for completion of the survey and those selected for 
interviews provided a true account of their experiences relevant to the scope 
of this study. 
2. Insight gained from the experiences shared by the participants is 
representative of what other members of the population that maintain aircraft 
for major U.S. air carriers experience. 
Limitations 
The following limitations are applied to this study: 
1. The study and final analysis of data focused on participants engaged in the 
performance of maintenance on U.S. certificated air carriers that provide 
scheduled passenger services under Part 121 of the Federal Aviation 
Regulations and operate aircraft with more than 70 seats.  Although 
information was obtained from survey participants that do not perform 
maintenance for air carriers meeting the above parameters, this information 
was excluded from the final analysis and results of this study. 
2. Selection of the initial survey participants was limited to a random sample 
taken of FAA certificated mechanics that reside within 15 miles of key 
airports used as maintenance hubs by American Airlines, United Airlines, 
Delta Air Lines and Southwest Airlines.  These hub cities were identified as: 
Tulsa, Oklahoma; Chicago, Illinois; Dallas, Texas; Ft. Worth, Texas; Atlanta, 
Georgia; and, Houston, Texas. 
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3. Data unrelated to maintenance of aircraft including but not limited to flight 
operations, ground operations, fueling, deicing, and cargo was excluded from 
this study. 
4. Initial data obtained from the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) 
regarding air carrier inspection reports for base-line analysis was limited to 
the FAA’s 2018 fiscal year which began on October 1st, 2017 and ended on 
September 31st, 2018. 
5. Participants interviewed for this study were limited to those participants that 
were involved with maintenance functions on aircraft operated by major U.S. 
air carriers and have at least two years of experience. 
6. General limitations affecting this study are noted as those resulting from the 
small sample size selected for the initial survey and follow-up interviews, the 
relevancy of participant experience with the subject matter, cultural 
differences and varying background of each participant.  
7. Analysis of the research data and subsequent interpretation of the results by 
both the researcher and readers of the report may be influenced by prior 
knowledge, past experience or lack of it.  This may place limitations on the 
acceptance and application of the analysis data within the industry. 
Organization of the Study 
This mixed methods study is described in five parts: the introduction, a literature 
review that includes a review of inspection data provided by the FAA, the methodology 
section, research findings, and conclusions.  Included at the end of the study is a list of 
references and an appendix containing the survey questions, survey reliability results, the 
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semi-structured list of questions used for the interviews, and the Institutional Review 






REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
A review of prior research found that error analysis is predominantly reactive 
following major accidents or incidents.  This section will review current research on 
maintenance errors within the airline industry, causal factors which have been identified, 
the theoretical perspective for the study, and a summary. 
Maintenance Errors Within the Airline Industry 
Much attention has been given to maintenance errors that are directly associated 
with aircraft accidents.  Significant maintenance error induced aircraft crashes include the 
crash of an American Airlines DC10 at Chicago’s O’Hare airport in 1979, the crash of a 
Japan Air Lines 747 into Mount Osutaka in 1985, the loss of a cockpit window on a 
BAC1-11 over Oxfordshire in 1990, and the in-flight break-up of an Embraer 120 over 
Eagle Lake, Texas in 1991 (Reason & Hobbs, 2003).  A study of 92 aircraft accidents 
found that 26 percent of them were affected by maintenance errors that played a role in 
the sequence of events leading up to the accidents (Liang et al., 2010).  Another study 
determined that human error was responsible for 70 to 80 percent of all aviation accidents  
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of which 15 to 20 percent were maintenance related (Chiu & Hsieh, 2016; Erjavac, et al., 
2018).  Traditional error identification in the airline industry is predominantly reactive 
and casual factors are only identified after an aircraft accident had occurred (Rashid, et 
al., 2014; Logan, 2008). 
Airline accidents are not acceptable to society (Logan, 2008).  The rise in the 
number of maintenance related errors has heightened both public and industry attention 
toward accident avoidance and proactive measures aimed at the identification of human 
factors that caused the errors (Logan, 2008; Shanmugam & Robert, 2015).  In an effort to 
determine the cause of errors, the Boeing Company (2013) developed its Maintenance 
Error and Decision Aid (MEDA) system in response to customer requests and the need to 
address maintenance errors.  Boeing defines an error as “a human action (or human 
behavior) that unintentionally deviates from the expected action (or behavior)” and 
defines violations as “a human action (or human behavior) that intentionally deviates 
from the expected action (or behavior)” (Boeing, 2013, p.2).   
Boeing’s development of the MEDA process incorporated information from a 
2004 report issued by the United Kingdom Flight Safety Committee who applied their 
Mandatory Occurrence Report (MOR) process to maintenance errors.  They identified the 
following top ten causes of errors listed in order from the highest level of occurrence to 
the lowest: 
1. Failure to follow published technical data or local instructions 
2. Using unauthorized procedures not referenced in technical data 




4. Failure to document maintenance properly in maintenance records or work 
package 
5. Inattention to detail/complacency 
6. Incorrectly installed hardware on an aircraft/engine 
7. Performing an unauthorized modification to the aircraft 
8. Failure to conduct a tool inventory after completion of the task 
9. Personnel not trained or certified to perform the task 
10. Ground support equipment improperly positioned for the task. 
(Boeing, 2013, p. 3) 
Boeing estimates that errors are likely to be caused by several contributing factors 
of which 80 percent to 90 percent can be controlled by management while the remainder 
can be controlled by maintenance personnel.  Therefore, Boeing argues that management 
has the ability to institute changes to avoid future occurrences of similar errors (Boeing, 
2013).  A proactive approach aims to detect and identify root causes for errors before 
they result in an aircraft accident rather than identify the causes of errors during the 
investigation of an aircraft accident (Rashid, et al., 2014). 
Causal Factors of Maintenance Errors 
Maintenance related errors can come from two directions: maintenance personnel 
may fail to discover a fault or fail to perform required maintenance tasks in full or in part, 
or; maintenance personnel may take direct actions that lead to a failure that otherwise 
would not have occurred (Reason & Hobbs, 2003).  Failure to follow procedures or 
following procedures that have vague or conflicting instructions are key factors that drive 
the commission of errors (Eiff & Suckow, 2008).  A controlled study conducted on 
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maintenance documentation found that user complacency along with poor work card 
instructions are major contributors to the commission of paperwork errors (Drury, 1998).  
This was further validated when two causal factors emerged in studies of aircraft 
maintenance errors, one causal factor was attributed to issues with maintenance 
instructions themselves and the other attributed to the actions taken by those performing 
tasks in a manner that is contrary to the documented instructions (Lattanzio, et al., 2008).  
Documentation errors can include missing or incorrect information, conflicting 
information, and information that is difficult for maintenance personnel to interpret 
(Lattanzio, et al., 2008).  FAA sponsored research that reviewed manufacturers’ 
documentation found that errors contained within the maintenance instructions were a 
leading cause of maintenance errors (Lattanzio, et al., 2008). 
User error includes failure to read or follow instructions, failure to retrieve the 
instructions, failure to perform required safety inspections, or failure to document work 
that was performed (Lattanzio, et al., 2008).  Failure to use written instructions can lead 
to errors.  A survey of technicians in a petrochemical plant found that only 58 percent of 
respondents said that they had the procedures open and available as they performed the 
work (Reason & Hobbs, 2003).  The survey results also determined that 56 percent of the 
operators and 51 percent of the managers had developed their own procedures in lieu of 
the established procedures for accomplishing the work (Reason & Hobbs, 2003).  When 
respondents were asked why they did not comply with the established procedures, they 
stated various reasons that included unawareness of the procedures, tasks would not be 
completed if the instructions were precisely followed, a preference on using their own 
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knowledge, and an assumption that they are already well familiar with the procedures 
(Reason & Hobbs, 2003). 
Communication issues have also been identified as a causal factor of maintenance 
errors.  A study on maintenance errors reviewed 1,182 Aviation Safety Reporting System 
(ASRS) reports and found that insufficient communication comprised eight percent of all 
the reports received and of that eight percent, over one-half were directly related to work 
turn-over communication issues (Parke & Kanki, 2008).  Complacency was identified as 
a causal factor of maintenance related errors in a study of one airline over a two-year 
period.  The repetitive and monotonous nature of the maintenance tasks drove 
complacency which led to the failure to use or follow technical instructions (Liang et al., 
2010).  Environmental factors such as poor lighting, confined spaces, and weather 
conditions can hide defects that would normally be found during a visual inspection by a 
maintenance inspector (Marais & Robichaud, 2012). 
To help understand what causes maintenance errors, in the 1990’s Boeing 
developed its MEDA process by incorporating information previously gathered by the 
U.S. Navy during the development of the Navy’s Human Factors Analysis and 
Classification System - Maintenance Extension (HFACS-ME).  In addition to analyzing 
errors, the Navy’s system also examined errors to determine if rule violations had 
occurred.  Violations are classified into three categories defined as “routine - a maintainer 
engages in practices, condoned by management, that bend the rules; “situational” - a 
maintainer strays from accepted procedures to save time, bending a rule; and 
“exceptional” - a maintainer willfully breaks standing rules disregarding the 
consequences.” (Boeing, 2013, p. 3). 
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Maintenance Errors Identified by the FAA 
Title 49 of the United States Code (49 U.S.C.) and Title 14 of the Code of Federal 
Regulations (14 CFR) provide the statutory power and authority for the Federal Aviation 
Administration (FAA) to regulate aviation.  One of the FAA’s many responsibilities is to 
ensure that air carriers conduct operations in compliance with federal regulations.  The 
FAA accomplishes this in part by utilizing their Safety Assurance System (SAS) that 
provides the tools and procedures to verify that certificated air carriers maintain 
operations in a safe manner while meeting all regulations and standards.  The SAS 
program is a risk-based approach that provides for the use of performance assessments in 
the form of checklists that FAA personnel can use to help determine if the air carrier 
meets FAA requirements and industry standards.  The assessments consist of top-level 
reviews that look at System Performance Assessments (SPA), mid-level Element Design 
Assessments (EDA) that look at individual system processes from a design perspective, 
and base level Element Performance Assessments (EPA) that look at the product or 
performance of each system (FAA, 2019a).  All three assessments use standardized 
checklists that provide FAA personnel with the means to adequately review and identify 
systems and actions that are contrary to the regulations.  The Element Performance (EP) 
Data Collection Tools (DCT) are the checklists that FAA inspectors routinely use to 
conduct inspections of air carriers and identify discrepancies that are later documented in 
formal compliance action letters sent to the air carriers. 
Each air carrier that is certified by the FAA to carry passengers under FAR Part 
121 is assigned a FAA Certificate Management Office (CMO) who must perform SAS 
inspections and document any discrepancies that are noted.  The discrepancies are 
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presented to the air carrier in writing and air carriers are obligated to respond with 
corrective action.  The corrective action taken by the air carrier is reviewed by the FAA 
and if approved, a closure letter is sent to the air carrier.  Both the initial investigation 
letters and the closure letters contain a wealth of information concerning the 
discrepancies identified by FAA inspectors during their inspections of the air carriers for 
compliance.  Unfortunately, these letters are not published but are kept on file by each 
FAA CMO for their assigned air carrier. 
In an effort to gather insight regarding errors committed by US air carriers, copies 
of correspondence related to inspections performed by the FAA of the four largest US air 
carriers were requested in accordance with the provisions of the Freedom of Information 
Act (FOIA).  Four major US air carriers were selected for review based on the highest 
number of air seat miles (ASMs) reported by the United States Department of 
Transportation - Bureau of Transportation Statistics (www.bts.gov) for the twelve-month 
period ending on September 30th, 2018.  The four air carriers with the highest number of 
ASMs for this period were identified as American Airlines (247,763,901 ASMs), United 
Airlines (241,075,102 ASMs), and Delta Air Lines (235,325,726 ASMs), and Southwest 
Airlines (157,317,793 ASMs).  Each of the FOIA requests asked for copies of 
compliance action documents submitted between October 1st, 2017 and September 30th, 
2018 which coincides with the FAA’s 2018 fiscal year.  The fiscal year is also reflected 
by the FAA in the file case numbering sequence that is used to document the compliance 
action letters. 
The FOIA requests defined Compliance Actions as actions taken by the FAA in 
accordance with FAA Order 8900.1, Flight Standards Information Management System 
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(FSIMS), Volume 14, Compliance and Enforcement, that result in written 
correspondence between the FAA and each of the air carriers regarding deficiencies 
noted by the FAA.  The FAA must perform its duties in accordance with FAA Order 
8900.1, Volume 14 and this particular section specifies how FAA inspections and 
investigations must be conducted. (FAA, 2016).  Requested correspondence was further 
defined in the FOIA requests as consisting of all Compliance Action (CA) letters, Hazard 
letters (HL), Record of Inspection (ROI) letters, and Letters of Investigation (LOI) on 
file.  The FAA was asked to provide copies of FAA correspondence issued to the air 
carrier, written correspondence submitted by the air carrier to the FAA in response to the 
compliance action, and written correspondence issued by the FAA to the air carrier 
closing each compliance action. 
The FOIA requests also defined certain documentation that was not requested as it 
was either not required for this study or is prohibited from release under FOIA 
guidelines.  Personal notes, memos, and/or checklists that may have been made or 
completed by FAA Inspectors during the course of their inspection activities were not 
requested.  Documentation related to compliance actions initiated by the FAA against 
individuals or organizations other than directly to these air carriers was not requested 
since the initial focus of this research was limited to the air carriers.  Documentation 
regarding voluntary disclosures submitted by these air carriers to the FAA were not 
requested due to the exemptions and protections extended to the release of voluntary 
disclosures submitted to the FAA.  Also excluded were documents and correspondence 
related to Aviation Safety Action Program (ASAP) submissions that have been accepted 
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into this program by the FAA since these submissions are also protected from release 
under FOIA. 
The FOIA requests were mailed to the FAA on February 25th, 2019 and were 
subsequently accepted and issued individual FOIA tracking numbers for further action.  
Three responses were received along with electronic scans of compliance actions from 
the FAA CMO’s for American Airlines, United Airlines, and Southwest Airlines within 
the response period specified by the FOIA requirements.  The response to FOIA Request 
No. 2019-004459GL for United Airlines inspection records was received along with 
copies of 25 compliance action letters comprising 195 pages.  This response also stated 
that the FAA found 373 pages of documents related to investigative notes, drafts of 
correspondence, and file checklists which were not provided since they were excluded 
from the initial FOIA request.  The response to FOIA Request No. 2019-004607 for 
Southwest Airlines inspection records was provided with copies of 93 compliance action 
letters comprising 290 pages.  The response stated that only four documents comprising a 
total of eight pages were withheld as they related to events that were already accepted 
into the air carrier’s voluntary disclosure program.  The response to FOIA Request No. 
2019-004608 for American Airlines inspection records was provided along with copies of 
89 compliance action letters comprising 501 pages.  The response also stated that only 20 
documents comprising 105 pages were withheld as they related to events already 
accepted into the air carrier’s voluntary disclosure program. 
However, the response letter dated July 9th, 2019 that was received regarding 
FOIA Request No. 2019-004290 for Delta Air Lines inspection records did not provide 
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the requested documentation.  Delta’s FAA CMO gave the following reasoning in the 
response letter for not providing copies of the compliance action letters: 
It should be noted that the Delta CMO utilizes a Memorandum of 
Understanding with Delta Air Lines which drives most compliance action 
activities into the Voluntary Disclosure Program, which has robust 
corrective action controls. This, in combination with the fact that most 
quality escapes at Delta involve individuals, which are captured in the 
Aviation Safety Action Program, is why there is not a large quantity of 
compliance action information (FAA response letter, July 9th, 2019). 
A copy of the Memorandum of Understanding with Delta Air Lines referenced by 
the FAA was not provided.  However, 19 pages of general email correspondence 
concerning the review and approval of a training curriculum for the 757 and the 
A319/A320/A321 aircraft were supplied.  The email correspondence appears to be 
unrelated to a specific FAA compliance action and does not reference any FAA 
compliance action file numbers.  The lack of any compliance documents is in stark 
contrast to what was provided by the FAA CMOs for the other three air carriers.  The 
position taken by Delta’s FAA CMO also appears to contradict FAA Advisory Circular 
00-58B (FAA, 2009) regarding Voluntary Disclosure Reporting Programs (VDRP) which 
states:  
In evaluating whether an apparent violation is covered by this policy, the 
FAA will ensure that the following five conditions are met: (1) The 
certificate holder, qualified fractional ownership program, or PAH has 
 
20 
notified the FAA of the apparent violation immediately after detecting it 
and before the Agency has learned of it by other means…(p. 4) 
The existence of a memorandum of understanding between the FAA and Delta 
that allows the conversion of FAA identified violations into air carrier submitted 
voluntary disclosures appears to conflict with the intent of this Advisory Circular.  In 
addition, FAA Order 8000.89 (2016a,) regarding the designation of VDRP information as 
protected from public disclosure also states that regulated entities are required to make 
initial notification to the FAA of a VDRP submission and must provide specific details of 
the apparent violation.  The submissions must also be clearly identified as VDRP 
submissions.  This sequence of events must take place before an air carrier is formally 
notified of an apparent violation by the FAA.  Appendix A of this Order contains public 
comments and FAA responses submitted prior to enactment and it contains an FAA 
response that stated “FAA policy prohibits acceptance of a submission under the VDRP 
when the FAA has already learned of the violation on its own” (FAA Order 8000.89, 
2016a, p. A-2).  The requirements contained in both the Advisory Circular and the FAA 
Order appear to be in direct conflict to the FAA’s position in their FOIA response 
whereby they allow FAA initiated compliance actions to be driven directly into Delta’s 
Voluntary Disclosure Program. 
An appeal was lodged regarding the FAA’s FOIA response noting the language in 
both the Order and the Advisory Circulars and arguing that FAA identified violations are 
not eligible for automatic inclusion in an air carrier’s VDRP program.  A decision 
regarding the appeal had not been made at the time this study was concluded.  Therefore, 
this study utilized the data submitted for FAA inspections conducted at American 
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Airlines, United Airlines, and Southwest Airlines.  The lack of data related to FAA 
inspections of Delta Air Lines imposed an additional limitation on the initial research and 
data that was gathered for this study. 
A review of compliance action documents provided for United Airlines, 
American Airlines, and Southwest Airlines was performed using a web-based program 
known as Dedoose and developed by SocioCultural Research Consultants, LLC (2019).  
This program is designed for qualitative analysis and allows the user to import 
spreadsheets, audio files, visual files, and transcripts or text as Word or Adobe PDF files.  
Data taken from these files can be highlighted and tagged with user created codes.  
Dedoose also allows for the direct importation of survey data from data collection 
programs such as Qualtrics and Survey Monkey.  All data that is imported or entered into 
the Dedoose program is encrypted and only accessible to the researcher and those who 
are extended user rights by the project owner thus ensuring security of the information. 
The documents received from the FAA were imported into Dedoose as PDF files.  
They were subsequently tabulated and given file names using the FAA assigned 
compliance action file numbers.  Each compliance action document was then coded using 
initial descriptors to identify the air carrier, the type of operation observed by the FAA, 
and if the letter was an initial notification letter sent to the air carrier or a letter closing-
out the compliance action.  Although requested by FOIA, the FAA provided very few 
copies of correspondence submitted to it by these air carriers.  However, the majority of 
FAA close-out letters reiterated what the air carrier had discovered during their 
investigation into the discrepancy and included the corrective action that was taken.  The 
close-out letters provided sufficient information to determine what action had been taken 
 
22 
by the air carrier to address the discrepancy.  The coding of the FAA’s initial 
observations was performed separately by applying descriptors to observations while 
coding of the casual factors reported in the FAA’s close-out letters was conducted using a 
separate set of descriptors that were specific to the causal factors. 
Initial review of the documents found that some of the compliance action letters 
predated the 2018 fiscal year reporting period specifically request by FOIA.  In addition, 
several other compliance actions had been provided which were addressed to individuals, 
not the air carrier.  Given that these compliance actions had not been requested but were 
supplied in error, they were subsequently removed and excluded from the review process.  
This left a remainder of 194 compliance actions of which 14 were issued to United 
Airlines (UA), 87 were issued to American Airlines (AA), and 93 were issued to 
Southwest Airlines (SW).  These compliance actions were then coded with descriptors to 
identify the type of air carrier operation that was subject to the FAA compliance action.  
The four descriptors used to identify the type of operations are maintenance operations, 
flight operations, non-maintenance ground operations, and one for actions that were later 
withdrawn by the FAA.  Figure 2.1 illustrates the results of the initial analysis which 
depicts 128 compliance actions related to maintenance activities, 46 related to flight 
activities, 19 related to ground activities and one action that had been withdrawn.  
Maintenance related compliance actions accounted for over half of the compliance 
actions received by American Airlines and Southwest Airlines during the FAA’s 2018 





Categorization of FAA Compliance Actions by Air Carrier and Category 
 
Further analysis of the compliance action letters was performed to identify the 
specific actions that had been observed and found questionable by the FAA.  The text of 
each letter was examined and general descriptors were developed and tagged to excerpts 
in the letters for qualitative analysis.  The review noted that some FAA compliance 
actions captured multiple issues or discrepancies that were listed in a single letter.  
Therefore, the total number of coded discrepancies was greater than the actual number of 
compliance letters.  The following is a description of each descriptor that was used to 




• Parts and material storage:  This code is applicable to observations related to the 
improper storage of parts and materials.  This can include both aircraft parts and raw 
materials, chemicals, and other related items used to repair aircraft. 
• Maintenance instruction issues:  This code is applicable to discrepancies that involve 
written instructions observed to be insufficient, incorrect, or are missing. 
• Management control issues: This code is applicable to errors related to the lack of 
oversight or control of aircraft maintenance.  This may include planning issues related 
to work card assignment, review of completed work cards, Bill of Work (BOW) 
issues, turn-over reporting, or verification of aircraft status following maintenance. 
• Mechanical discrepancies: This code is applicable to mechanical discrepancies 
observed by the FAA and reported to the air carrier without inference to a specific 
maintenance error. 
• Missing documentation or tags:  This code is applicable to observations relating to 
records, documents, tags, and placards that are missing or incorrect. 
• Missing parts or equipment:  This code is applicable to observations related to parts 
and equipment that is missing. 
• Maintenance entry errors:  This code is applicable to observations of maintenance 
entry discrepancies.  This can also include omission of entries that should have been 
made to document maintenance actions taken or required. 
• Procedure not FAA approved:  This code is applicable to observations related to 
maintenance procedures, policies, and practices that require FAA approval but were 
not approved or submitted to the FAA for approval. 
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• Task deviation:  This code is applicable to observations of deviations that were made 
from stated instructions or maintenance requirements as defined in maintenance 
manual instructions, documented procedures, or work instructions.  This also includes 
the application of work instructions that were not applicable to the aircraft or 
maintenance task under observation. 
• Task not performed:  This code is applicable to observations of maintenance actions 
including inspections, procedures, or work tasks that were not performed or missed in 
whole or in part nor were alternate means of accomplishment applied.  This also 
includes non-performance of an entire work card or procedure. 
• Tool calibration issues: This code is applicable to observations regarding tools and 
equipment calibration that are found to be missing or expired.  It does not include 
observations related to missing tools and equipment unless the error is associated with 
the tool calibration tracking program. 
• Training or qualification issues:  This code is applicable to observations related to the 
training and qualifications of maintenance personnel.  It includes observations of 
individuals that were not qualified to perform the work, lacked recurrent training, or 
failed to undertake or complete training. 
Analysis of the results are displayed below in Figure 2.2.  The results found that 
American Airlines had the greatest number of maintenance discrepancies of which 
maintenance entry errors were dominant with 86 reported errors.  Task deviation errors 
were the second highest category with 37 instances followed by 31 instances of tasks that 
should have been accomplished but had not been performed.  Southwest Airlines was 
found to have task deviation errors as their highest error category with 18 reported 
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discrepancies followed by errors attributed to tasks that were not performed and errors 
associated with maintenance instructions with both categories each having 11 reported 
errors.  The small volume of documents provided for United Airlines compliance actions 
resulted in only seven reported maintenance errors which found that task deviation errors 
were the most common with three reported occurrences.  This is followed by two 
incidents that found maintenance tasks that had not been performed, one incident 
attributed to errors with the maintenance instructions, and another error related to missing 
documentation. 
Figure 2.2 
Discrepancies Observed by the FAA 
 
Analysis of compliance action closure letters required the creation of a different 
set of descriptors for casual actions to reflect why the errors had occurred.  This is in 
contrast to the descriptors developed for the initial compliance action letters that 
identified what errors were observed.  The review also noted that closure letters were not 
provided for 12 of the compliance actions.  It is possible that air carrier responses to 
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compliance actions were still in development and not available at the time the 
information was requested by FOIA.  The lack of closure letters prevented the coding of 
causal factors related to the discrepancies noted in those letters.  It was also observed that 
in a few instances, air carriers reported multiple causes for a single compliance error.  
This necessitated the assignment of multiple causal codes to that error.  The following is 
a description of each code developed for categorization and coding of the causal factors 
reported to the FAA by the air carriers and were included in the FAA’s compliance action 
closure letters: 
• Instruction error:  The cause for the error was attributed to maintenance and process 
instructions that contained inaccurate information, incomplete instructions, or 
instructions that did not include detailed instructions for the task. 
• Discrepancy found invalid:  Upon review, the air carrier determined that the 
discrepancy reported by the FAA was invalid and was not a compliance issue. 
• Failure to follow instructions:  The cause for the error was attributed to a failure to 
follow maintenance instructions or procedural requirements.  This includes failure to 
follow general air carrier policy and procedural instructions. 
• Ineffective process controls:  The cause for the error was attributed to ineffective 
control of the maintenance process or a lack of a measurement process. 
• Administrative or program error:  The cause of the error was attributed to 
maintenance related programs and policies that were found inadequate, lacked 
sufficient detail, or required revision. 
• Lack of training or knowledge:  The cause for the error was attributed to maintenance 
personnel lack of training or knowledge. 
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• Maintenance entry error:  The cause of the error was attributed to individuals who 
made mistakes documenting maintenance and related tasks by failing to communicate 
clearly, entering incorrect information, or omitting relevant information. 
• Unknown:  The cause of the error was not listed in the compliance action closure 
letter or the closure letter lacked sufficient detail to identify the causal factors. 
Analysis of the results are displayed below in Figure 2.3.  The air carriers reported 
that 13 of the FAA observed discrepancies were invalid and that the observed actions 
were correct and in compliance with regulatory and airline requirements.  Analysis of the 
compliance action closure letters also found that no causal information was provided for 
13 of the FAA reported observations.  Analysis of the remaining closure letters identified 
the top three causal factors for each of the three air carriers.  The top three causal factors 
for American Airlines are maintenance entry errors with 84 verified mistakes, failure to 
follow instructions with 77 verified mistakes, and instruction errors responsible for 18 
mistakes.  The top three causal factors for Southwest Airlines are failure to follow 
instructions with 14 verified mistakes, instruction errors were responsible for nine 
mistakes, and administrative or program errors were responsible for seven of the 
mistakes.  The small number of compliance actions provided for United Airlines made it 
difficult to determine the top three causal factors related to the errors observed by the 
FAA.  Two of the causal factors were attributed to mistakes associated with instruction 
errors and the remaining three causal factors attributed to mistakes associated with failure 






Causal Factors Reported by Air Carriers 
 
Surprisingly, the compliance action closure letters that identified actions taken by 
the air carriers seldom made mention of human factors as causal factors.  There were 19 
instances where the closure actions noted human factors as a contributor to the 
commission of errors.  Of the 19 instances, eight were attributed to lack of awareness by 
one or more employees, seven were attributed to complacency, three were attributed to 
lack of attention, one was attributed to distraction, and one was attributed to human 
factors as a general category without further delineation.  There is the possible that root 
cause analysis was performed internally by the air carriers but not reported to the FAA or 
alternatively, the FAA may have omitted this information from some of the compliance 





Human Factors as Causal Elements Reported by Air Carriers 
 
The review of literature together with the analysis and review of the FAA’s 2018 
compliance actions taken against three of the four largest air carriers in the U.S. suggest 
that the most predominant maintenance errors are associated with maintenance record 
entries, failure to follow instructions, and errors involving the content of maintenance 
instructions.  Corrective action taken by the three air carriers suggest that the top causal 
factors are failure to follow instructions, maintenance instruction errors, and maintenance 
entry errors.  Human factors are recognized as contributors to the commission of errors.  
However, the corrective actions reported in the FAA’s compliance action closure letters 
made little mention of them choosing instead to focus on the subject of the error itself for 





The theory that informs this study is human error theory and the dynamics of error 
causation developed by Dr. James Reason and described in his book Human Error 
(1990).  Reason applied several tenants of cognitive psychology theories that he made 
after observing and cataloging human errors. (Larouzée & Guarnieri, 2015). What began 
with a self-observation of a mistake he had made in 1977 when he confused his cat’s food 
dish for his teapot drove Reason to question the causes of human error (Larouzée & 
Guarnieri, 2015).  According to Reason (1990), human error is defined as “a generic term 
to encompass all those occasions in which a planned sequence of mental or physical 
activities fails to achieve its intended outcome, and when these failures cannot be 
attributed to the intervention of some chance agency” (p. 9). 
Human error theory was further refined to examine errors from both a person 
approach and from a systems approach (Reason, 2000).  The person approach is 
traditionally used to describe errors as unsafe acts committed by individuals whereas a 
systems approach provides much more information to help identify latent issues that may 
have contributed to the unsafe acts (Reason, 2000).  Reason’s theory on human error is 
useful to this study as it will allow maintenance errors to be studied in a controlled 
manner to determine causal factors that lead to the commission of the errors. 
Summary 
Both the public and the airline industry have a greater awareness of maintenance 
induced errors and the need to avoid them to prevent accidents and incidents (Logan, 
2008; Shanmugam & Robert, 2015).  Previous research has linked some of the errors to 
acts of complacency following written instructions, errors associated with written 
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instructions, and the lack of turn-over reporting (Druary, 1998; Parke & Kanki, 2008; 
Lattanzio, et al., 2008).  A review of compliance actions supplied by the FAA regarding 
errors observed at three of the top four U.S. air carriers found that the most predominant 
maintenance errors are associated with maintenance record entries, failure to follow 
instructions, and errors involving maintenance instructions.  This study sought to further 
identify the predominant maintenance errors within the U.S. airline industry and evaluate 
the causal factors that allowed them to occur.  Beneficiaries of this study include the 
airlines that operate commercial aircraft, government agencies responsible for ensuring 
that maintenance is properly performed, personnel and firms that perform maintenance 








This chapter describes the research design selected for the study, the participants, 
data collection, reliability and validity, data analysis, and a summary of the methodology. 
Research Design 
This study employed the mixed-methods research approach to provide initial 
confirmatory research using quantitative data gathered through the use of surveys 
followed sequentially by the performance of interviews to gather qualitative data (Patton, 
2015).  Creswell and Plano Clark (2018) describe the core characteristics of mixed 
method research as the means to acquire both qualitative and quantitative data allowing 
integration of the data to achieve results using a research design that is both logical and 
lies within established principles and theory.  Employing the mixed-method approach 
allows the use of both quantitative and qualitative research methods to support and 
supplement each other thus providing a better understanding of the research problem than 
would be possible using either research method by itself (Gay, Mills, & Airasian, 2012). 
The specific type of mixed methods design selected for this research is the 
explanatory sequential design which provides for two phases for data acquisition 
performed in sequence using quantitative methods for data acquisition followed by the 
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use of qualitative methods (Creswell & Plano Clark, 2018, Creswell & Guetterman, 
2019).  This type of design is also known as the QUAN-qual model as it places priority 
and weight on the quantitative data that is initially gathered while fostering the use of 
qualitative data to further explain the results (Gay, et al., 2012, Creswell & Guetterman, 
2019).  The first phase permits quantitative data to be acquired and analyzed using 
descriptive statistics as a generalized approach toward answering the research questions.  
Use of this design facilitates the accomplishment of the second phase by providing the 
ability to select a sample of first phase participants for follow-up acquisition of data.  The 
second phase further explores and adds definition to the results obtained during the first 
phase through in-depth qualitative methodology and analysis of descriptive data 
(Creswell & Plano Clark, 2018).  The explanatory sequential mixed-method design for 
this study provided the quantitative means to identify maintenance errors and causal 
elements common to maintenance performed on aircraft operated by major U.S. air 
carriers while allowing for in-depth review of errors and causal factors through 
qualitative means (Creswell & Guetterman, 2019).  A disadvantage of this design is that 
it requires a greater length of time to complete the acquisition of data (Creswell & Plano 
Clark, 2018).  
The quantitative portion of the mixed methods design for this study employed the 
survey design research method utilizing a structured set of questions with a set of ordinal 
frequency-based responses that allows for analysis using descriptive statistical analysis 
tools.  The use of a survey as a quantitative instrument to gather data relative to 
commission of maintenance errors was particularly useful prior to the commencement of 
qualitative research through interviews as it provided a better understanding of the overall 
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responses provided to each of the survey questions.  The survey is considered a 
descriptive survey as its purpose is to gather data that will help determine trends and 
incidence (Kelley-Quon, 2018).  Of key interest for this study was the identification of 
errors, causal factors, and human factors that are the most prevalent during the 
performance of maintenance on aircraft operated by major U.S. air carriers. 
The use of mail surveys has been shown to have a much higher response rate than 
those that are administered through a web site (Fowler, 2014).  In addition, the lack of e-
mail addresses for the participants together with the possibility that participants may not 
have reliable Internet access are some of the disadvantages associated with administering 
the survey online (Fink, 2013).  Survey response rates can also be improved using gift or 
cash incentives (Fink, 2013).  This study adopted an incentive in the form of a five-dollar 
Starbucks gift card as advance consideration for completion of the survey.  Providing an 
incentive at the same time that a participant receives a traditional survey has generally 
been shown to be effective at increasing the survey response rate (Schonlau, Fricker & 
Elliott, 2002). 
The qualitative portion of the mixed methods design used the grounded theory 
design to study a sample of the survey participants through interviews to gain better 
insight into the most common errors that occur with maintenance activities performed on 
aircraft operated by major U.S. air carriers.  Each interview was conducted using the 
same set of open-ended questions in a semi-structured format supplemented with 
additional unstructured questions to elicit personal stories to add validity and depth to the 
survey results.  To encourage participation in the interview process, individuals were 
offered a cash incentive of 100 dollars for completing the interview process. 
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According to Patton (2015), “Qualitative data can put flesh on the bones of 
quantitative results, bringing the results to life through in-depth elaboration.” (p.230).  
Utilizing the mixed methods design approach where quantitative data was acquired using 
surveys coupled with the acquisition of qualitative data using the grounded theory design 
provides a better understanding of the research problem (Creswell & Guetterman, 2019).  
The application for this study was approved by the Oklahoma State University 
Institutional Review Board on February 6th, 2020 and is attached as Appendix D. 
Participants 
This study was focused on the identification of errors made or encountered by 
mechanics performing maintenance on aircraft operated by major U.S. airlines and 
determination of causal factors that led to the commission of the errors.  Participants for 
this study were mechanics and maintenance qualified personnel that were directly 
involved with the performance of maintenance on such aircraft. 
Population.  The population for this study consists of all individuals in the U.S. 
that hold an airframe or power plant certificates issued by the Federal Aviation 
Administration (FAA) and who were actively performing maintenance functions on U.S. 
registered aircraft.  The population does not include individuals who are non-certificated 
individuals.  The goal of this study was not to generalize to larger groups although the 
results of this study may be transferrable to other individuals who may not hold FAA 
mechanic certificates but who are involved with maintenance of aircraft.  The target 
population or sampling frame was comprised of all FAA certificated mechanics that 
appear on the listing of FAA certificated individuals that existed at the time it was 
downloaded from the FAA’s website on January 28th, 2020.  A review of the FAA’s 
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database found that there are over 270,000 individuals who held airframe and/or 
powerplant mechanic certificates worldwide (FAA, 2019). 
Sampling method.  The initial sampling method used to identify the sample 
population for the first phase of this study is multistage cluster sampling.  This method 
allows the selection of the sample to be conducted in several stages if the subject 
population is large and cannot be easily defined (Creswell & Guetterman, 2019).  There 
are thousands of FAA certificate mechanics domiciled throughout the world who are 
engaged in a variety of occupations that may or may not be related to maintenance of 
U.S. air carrier aircraft.  The first phase of research involved the selection of a sample 
population of maintenance mechanics from the entire population based on their 
residential proximity to the maintenance hubs of the four largest U.S air carriers.  It was 
from this group that randomly selected individuals were selected and sent an invitation to 
complete the survey.  The second phase involved the selection of individuals from those 
who completed the survey and who indicated their willingness to be interviewed.  
Individuals for the second phase of research were selected based on their willingness to 
participate and having met the experience requirements pertaining to maintenance on 
aircraft operated by major U.S. air carriers. 
The first step to determine the population of FAA certificated mechanics made 
use of the database maintained by the FAA of certificated individuals which is available 
to the public and can be downloaded from the FAA’s web site at:  
https://www.faa.gov/licenses_certificates/airmen_certification/releasable_airmen_downlo
ad/.  This database contains the mailing addresses for each individual and the type of 
certificates held.  The database was initially sorted to identify only those individuals that 
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held an aircraft maintenance technician certificate issued by the FAA for airframe, power 
plant, or a combination of both specialties.  Over 270,000 individuals were initially 
identified as meeting this qualification.  The resultant listing was sorted again to identify 
those individuals that reside within 15 miles of the major airport maintenance hubs 
belonging to American Airlines, United Airlines, Delta Air Lines, and Southwest Airlines 
located in Tulsa, Oklahoma; Chicago, Illinois; Dallas, Texas; Ft. Worth, Texas; Atlanta, 
Georgia; and, Houston, Texas.  There were 12,064 individuals who met this criterion.  
The purposeful selection of these geographic areas was intended to allow a greater 
opportunity for selection of individuals performing maintenance on aircraft operated by 
these air carriers. 
Initial Survey Sample.  An initial random purposive sample of participants for 
completion of the survey were selected from the target population provided that meet the 
following criteria: 
• Hold an aircraft maintenance technician certificate issued by the FAA for 
airframe, power plant, or a combination of both specialties. 
• Have addresses that are located within 15 miles of key airports used as 
maintenance hubs by American Airlines, United Airlines, Delta Air Lines and 
Southwest Airlines.  These hub cities are identified as: Tulsa, Oklahoma; 
Chicago, Illinois; Dallas, Texas; Ft. Worth, Texas; Atlanta, Georgia; and, 
Houston, Texas. 
Secondary Interview Sample.  A purposive sample of participants for the 
interview process was selected from the sample population of individuals that responded 
to the initial survey and who met the following criteria: 
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• Have stated on the initial survey that they are involved with the performance 
of maintenance on aircraft operated by major airlines. 
• Have stated on the initial survey that they had a minimum of two years’ 
experience performing aircraft maintenance. 
• Have stated their desire to participate as a subject for the interview process. 
Factors such as age, gender, or ethnicity did not exclude participants from the 
interview sample.  However, a minimum of two years of experience was required for 
those willing to be interviewed given that each participant must have sufficient 
knowledge of air carrier maintenance activities.  Aircraft mechanics that were not 
involved with maintenance activities performed on aircraft operated by an FAA 
certificated air carrier were disqualified from the interview portion of the study.  Aircraft 
mechanics domiciled outside of the United States were also be excluded from the sample 
due to the difficulty communicating with individuals residing at remote locations and the 
influence that foreign aircraft regulatory agencies may have on maintenance activities. 
The desirable sample size for the initial survey portion of this study was initially 
set at 100 with the expectation that a minimum of 50 participants involved with the 
performance of maintenance on aircraft operated by major air carriers would respond and 
complete the survey.  The desirable number of participants anticipated for the interview 
portion of this study was expected to be no less than five and no more than ten 
individuals.  These numbers were deemed adequate for gathering of quantitative and 
qualitative data necessary for a the mixed-methods study of predominate maintenance 




Survey Sample Results.  The listing of 12,064 individuals that comprised the 
sample population was randomly sorted using a table of random digits generated by using 
a Microsoft Excel software command.  From the randomly sorted list, the first 100 
individuals were selected to receive a request to participate in the study.  Each of the 100 
individuals was mailed a letter describing the study and a request to complete an enclosed 
survey.  A consent form was also provided that had to be signed and returned with the 
survey to indicate acceptance for inclusion in the study as a participant.  An incentive in 
the form of a five-dollar Starbucks gift card was also provided.  A stamped and addressed 
envelope was also provided so that participants could return the survey and signed 
consent letter. 
Of the initial 100 survey requests that were sent, six surveys were completed and 
returned of which four were completed by individuals who indicated that they were 
involved with the performance of maintenance on aircraft with more than 70 seats and 
operated by major airlines.  Three surveys were returned by recipients who stated that 
they did not wish to take the survey.  The United States Postal Service (USPS) returned 
an additional 13 survey requests after determining that they were not deliverable and 
could not be forwarded to an alternate address.  No responses were received from the 
remaining 78 surveys that had been mailed.  The lack of responses coupled with the 
return of undeliverable survey requests prompted the need for selection of additional 
individuals from the sample population and the need for a more efficient method to 
conduct the survey. 
An alternate method for survey completion was adopted whereby the survey 
could be accessed by participants using a web-based survey portal administered by 
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Qualtrics, a provider of customer focused software tools (Qualtrics, Provo, UT).  Rather 
than mail a request letter together with a paper copy of the survey, the consent form, gift 
card, and a return envelope, additional individuals that were selected were mailed a 
revised survey request letter that summarized the purpose of the study and mentioned the 
availability of a five-dollar Starbucks gift card for completing the survey.  Instructions on 
accessing the survey through the Qualtrics website were also provided that included a 
web address as well as QR code that a recipient could scan on a smartphone and 
automatically be directed to the survey.  The consent form was incorporated into the 
Qualtrics site and participants were required to identify themselves and indicate their 
consent to be included in the study before being allowed to take the survey.  The survey 
questions and the order in which they were presented to the participants remained 
identical on both the original mail-in survey and the Qualtrics web-based survey.  The 
incentive offered to participants did not change but the language in request letter and 
consent form were revised to indicate that the incentive would be offered to individuals 
upon completion of the web-based survey.  At the conclusion of the web-based survey, 
participants were asked if they wished to receive the incentive and if so, they were 
instructed to provide an email address or mailing address that was used to send the 
incentive.  The Oklahoma State University Institutional Review Board was contacted 
regarding these changes and a reply was received on May 28th, 2020 that stated no 
modification was required regarding their original approval for this study as it did not 
increase the risks or change the study population. 
Individuals were also prompted for their willingness to be interviewed for the 
second phase of the study at the conclusion of the survey.  This was facilitated using the 
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Qualtrics platform which allowed for the request to appear in the survey after participants 
had answered the demographic question regarding their maintenance background.  Those 
that indicated they were engaged in the performance of maintenance for major airlines 
would be prompted with a follow-on question asking if they were willing to be 
interviewed and informing them of the incentive offer available to those who were 
selected and completed the interview process.  Participants who indicated their 
willingness to be interviewed were then prompted for their contact information and 
further instructed that if selected, they would be receiving a separate consent form sent to 
them through the mail that would have to signed and returned prior to commencement of 
the interview. 
An additional 400 individuals were selected from the sample population who 
were listed immediately following the initial 100 individuals that appeared on the 
randomly sorted listing.  Of the 400 who were sent the letters, 31 completed the survey.  
There were 37 survey request letters that were returned as undeliverable by the USPS.  
This response rate was also deemed insufficient, and another 500 individuals were 
selected from the sample population and sent the survey request letter.  The 500 
individuals selected from the sample population were those who appeared on the 
randomly sorted listing immediately following the initial 100 individuals and subsequent 
400 individuals that had been selected.  Of this group of 500 individuals, 34 participants 
completed the survey.  There were 71 survey request letters that were returned as 
undeliverable by the USPS.  The combined results of the 1000 survey requests that had 
been sent resulted in the generation of 71 survey responses of which 48 responses were 
completed by individuals that perform maintenance on airline operated aircraft having 
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more than 70 seats.  A total of 128 survey request letters were returned by USPS as 
undeliverable. 
Interview Sample Results.  There were 12 individuals that completed the survey 
and who indicated their willingness to be interviewed for the second phase of the study.  
Of these 12 individuals, ten were randomly selected and mailed consent forms for review 
and signature.  Nine of these individuals returned the consent forms and were 
subsequently interviewed.  The interviews were conducted by telephone and recorded 
with the prior consent of each participant.  The recordings were transcribed and all 
identifying information was redacted.  Each of these participants are identified in this 
study using applied pseudonyms of Participant A through Participant I. 
Data Collection 
Data collection for this mixed methods study used a survey as the instrument to 
gather quantitative data for the first phase of the study and interviews conducted using a 
semi-structured list of questions to gather qualitative data for the second phase of the 
study.  The design of the survey used a cross-sectional survey design which focused on 
gathering information at a single point in time to “examine current attitudes, beliefs, 
opinions, or practices” of the respondents (Creswell & Guetterman, 2019, p. 386).  A 
limited amount of qualitative data was also gathered during the first phase of this study 
from comments left in response to the three open response questions contained in the 
survey. 
The second phase of the study gathered data through interviews of survey 
participants who were selected from those participants that completed the survey and who 
indicated their willingness to be interviewed.  The interviews were performed using a 
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semi-structured interview process where participants were asked a specific set of 
questions supplemented by additional non-structured questions to allow further 
exploration of responses provided to the structured questions (Merriam & Tisdell, 2016).  
A lengthy list of questions was not used since doing so might result in lack of focus and 
prompt extraneous information not sought by the researcher (Gay, et al., 2012).  The 
questions were written to elicit participant knowledge of errors and behaviors based on 
the participant’s knowledge and experiences in the workplace (Merriam & Tisdell, 2016). 
The interview process collected data using individual interviews that were 
conducted over the telephone.  An informed consent document was mailed to each 
participant and interviews were not performed until the consent forms had been signed 
and returned.  Interviews were scheduled with each participant to minimize any impact to 
the participant’s schedule.  An audio recording of the interview was made with the 
consent of the participant.  The recording allowed for transcription of the interview and 
coding after the interview. 
Instruments. The instrument used to gather data for quantitative analysis was a 
survey constructed using an attitude scale that can capture a participant’s beliefs toward a 
situation (Gay, et al., 2012).  This type of survey is considered a descriptive survey which 
“does not assume a hypothesis but instead serves to collect data that will be reported to 
understand overall trends, incidence and prevalence of the outcome of interest” (Kelley-
Quon, 2018, p.361).  The survey questions employed an ordinal scale to provide the 
means to perform statistical analysis on the results (Creswell & Guetterman, 2019).  Each 
question provided five choices to reflect the relative frequency of the occurrence noted in 
the question.  The first five choices for each question regarding the frequency of 
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occurrence are: 1. Never, 2. Rarely, 3. Sometimes, 4. Regularly, and 5. Often.  This 
affords the opportunity for each survey participant to identify the frequency of occurrence 
for each item under study.  A sixth response selection was included that provided each 
participant with the ability to indicate that they prefer not to respond to a question. 
The 21 survey questions were arranged into three sections.  The first section 
contained 11 questions focused on the type of errors that was previously identified during 
the review of the FAA’s compliance actions.  The errors were categorized as having 
involved one of the following attributes: 
• Storage of aircraft parts and materials. 
• Content of maintenance instructions. 
• Scheduling and/or control of the maintenance process. 
• Handling of maintenance documents, records, tags, forms, or placards. 
• Installation of parts or equipment. 
• Completion of maintenance entries. 
• Maintenance performed using procedures that are not accepted or approved. 
• Maintenance steps or tasks performed that deviate from written instructions or 
procedure. 
• Maintenance steps or tasks that were overlooked or not performed. 
• Handling, usage, or control of calibrated tools and equipment. 
• Training requirements, recurrent training, or maintaining of qualifications. 
A twelfth question was included that asked participants to describe other maintenance 
errors they have observed that do not fall into one of the previously mentioned 11 
categories.  A text block was provided to capture the responses. 
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The second section of the survey contained seven questions focused on the cause 
of maintenance errors.  There were six causal factors identified during analysis of the air 
carrier responses noted in the FAA compliance action closure letters.  The first six 
questions asked participants to indicate the frequency that each of these causal factors 
were responsible for maintenance errors that had been committed in their workplace.  The 
six causal factors were identified as: 
• Policies and procedures that are inadequate, lack sufficient detail, or do not 
contain current information. 
• Failure to follow maintenance instructions or procedural requirements. 
• Ineffective controls over the maintenance process or the lack of a 
measurement process. 
• Maintenance and process instructions that contain inaccurate information or 
lacked sufficient detail. 
• Maintenance personnel lacking sufficient training or knowledge. 
• Failure to make maintenance entries or omitting relevant information in 
logbooks, maintenance records, or other record keeping documents. 
A seventh question was included that asked participants to describe other types of causal 
factors other than those noted in the previous questions that they believed were 
responsible for causing maintenance errors in their workplace.  The survey provided a 
text block to capture written responses to this question. 
The third section of the survey was devoted to the identification of human factors 
that cause or contribute to maintenance errors known to the survey participants.  The 
analysis of FAA compliance action closure letters noted that four types of human factors 
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were mentioned as having caused or contributed to some of the maintenance errors that 
were reported.  These human factors were identified as lack of awareness, complacency, 
distraction, and lack of attention.  Participants were asked to indicate the frequency that 
each of these four human factors caused or contributed to maintenance errors.  A fifth 
question was included to allow participants to list other human factors that they believed 
may have caused or contributed to maintenance errors in their workplace.  A free text 
block was also provided to allow participants the ability to respond. 
The fourth and final section of the survey contained three questions that elicited 
demographic information.  The first question asked if the participants were actively 
engaged in the performance of aircraft maintenance.  The choices were (a) yes, (b) no, 
and (c) prefer not to respond. The second question prompted the participants to indicate 
the category of aviation in which they are involved.  The choices were (a) general 
aviation, (b) corporate aviation, (c) air taxi and commuter aviation that operate as 
unscheduled passenger services using aircraft with 19 seats or less, (d) regional airlines 
that provide scheduled passenger services using aircraft with 70 passenger seats or less, 
(e) major airlines that have scheduled passenger services using aircraft with more than 70 
seats, (f) cargo carrier, (g) other, (h) none, and (i) prefer not to respond.  The third 
question asked participants to indicate how many years of experience they have with 
aircraft maintenance activities.  The choices were expressed in ranges identified as (a) no 
experience, (b) up to 2 years’ experience, (c) 2 years but less than 5 years’ experience, (d) 
5 years’ but less than 10 years’ experience, (e) 10 years’ but less than 20 years’ 
experience, (f) greater than 20 years’ experience, and (g) prefer not to respond.  The 
survey questions used for this study are attached as Appendix A. 
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The instrument used to conduct the secondary phase of research was a list of 
semi-structured questions employed in the interview process to gather in-depth data for 
qualitative analysis.  The interview method for gathering data is particularly useful as it 
can provide data that occurred in the past and is not observable (Gay, et al., 2012).  Each 
interview was conducted by following a series of semi-structured open-ended questions 
that had been prepared in advance.  Using standardized questions can minimize variation 
for data collection purposes (Patton, 2015).  As the semi-structured questions were 
answered, additional questions were asked to help clarify or further explore information 
provided by the participant.  An informal interview approach was adopted for non-
standardized questions to further understand the information from each participant’s 
perspective (Patton, 2015).  The list of semi-structured questions that was developed and 
used during the interview process is attached as Appendix B. 
Reliability and Content Validity 
Establishing reliability and content validity within mixed methods research 
designs that incorporated both quantitative and qualitative research requires the use of 
several approaches to validate data quality and the interpretation of the results (Creswell 
& Plano Clark, 2018). 
The reliability of the survey instrument used for the initial quantitative phase of 
this mixed-method research study must ensure that participant scores are consistent and 
meaningful with respect to the elements under study (Gay, et al., 2012, Creswell & 
Guetterman, 2019, Creswell & Plano Clark, 2018).  Validity with respect to quantitative 
research is best described as how well an instrument measures what it is supposed to 
measure (Creswell & Guetterman, 2019, Robinson & Leonard, 2019).  A test or survey is 
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considered reliable if participants answer a question in the same manner that they answer 
related questions (Creswell & Guetterman, 2019). 
According to Creswell and Guetterman (2019), to ensure reliability, it is 
important that the questions in the survey are written so that they are clear to the survey 
participants and that the method used to administer the survey are standardized.  The 
survey used for this study was drafted using simple language and terms that should be 
understood by the participants, all of whom are required to understand the English 
language as a requirement for holding an FAA mechanic’s certificate.  Pre-testing of the 
survey was accomplished by test subjects chosen from the Tulsa, Oklahoma area who 
were known to the researcher and who were certificated mechanics with experience 
working for a major U.S. air carrier.  They were asked to take the survey and provide 
their comments and recommendations.  Their comments and recommendations were then 
used to further edit and improve the survey.  The test participants were subsequently 
excluded from the purposeful random sample of participants selected for the survey.  
Once testing was completed, the final version of the survey was administered in paper 
format to the initial 100 participants selected for the study.  An additional 900 
participants that were selected from the sample population were sent a letter that 
requested their completion of the survey as an on-line survey accessible through the 
Qualtrics website.  In both instances, the survey questions and the order in which they 
were listed remained unchanged. 
Measuring the internal consistency of the instrument to support reliability was 
accomplished by examining how a participant’s answers are scored throughout the survey 
using Cronbach’s alpha.  This test is applied to the survey results by comparing how the 
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results for each survey question relate to each other and to the results of the entire survey 
(Gay, et al., 2012).  Cronbach’s alpha was developed by Lee Cronbach in 1951 as a 
means of measuring the internal consistency of a test or instrument and is expressed as a 
number between 0 and 1.0 (Tavakol & Dennick, 2011).  To support the internal 
consistency of a test or survey, the questions should be interrelated with each other and 
unidirectional (Tavakol & Dennick, 2011).  Cronbach’s alpha values that range from 0.70 
to 0.95 are considered acceptable values to indicate internal consistency although values 
in excess of .90 may suggest that several of the questions on the survey are measuring 
identical items (Tavakol & Dennick, 2011).  A low alpha value may indicate that the 
survey questions are not interrelated or that there are not enough questions in the survey 
itself (Tavakol & Dennick, 2011). 
Measuring the internal consistency of the survey questions was conducted using 
the survey data generated by the 48 participants who indicated they were primarily 
involved with the performance of aircraft maintenance functions on aircraft owned or 
operated by major air carriers.  Of the 27 questions in the survey, 21 were designed as 
Likert style questions using the same series of ordinal frequency-based responses.  
Analysis was conducted using the software program, Statistical Package for the Social 
Sciences (SPSS) to measure Cronbach’s alpha for these 21 questions.  Cronbach’s alpha 
was calculated on the entirety of the 21 questions and repeated using the data from the 
first 11 questions that focused on the frequency of specific error types and again on the 
remaining 10 questions that focused on the causal factors of maintenance errors. 
The results of the measurements found that the Cronbach’s alpha for the 21 
questions was .915 which indicates a high level of internal consistency.  Although 
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readings in excess of .90 may suggest that some of the questions may be measuring 
identical items, other than the structure of the questions, each one is unique with respect 
to a specific type or error or causal factor.  The measurement was repeated but limited to 
the 11 questions related to maintenance errors and this resulted in a Cronbach’s alpha of 
.869 which also demonstrates a high level of internal consistency.  The remaining 10 
questions related to causal factors were also analyzed and were found to have a 
Cronbach’s alpha of .839. 
Cronbach’s alpha was also calculated to determine how internal consistency 
would change upon the removal of each question from the three groupings that were 
measured.  The removal of an individual question from each grouping resulted in a 
change to the Cronbach’s alpha of plus or minus .01 which does not impact the overall 
reliability of the survey.  The tables identifying the Cronbach’s alpha for each group and 
the resultant change in alpha for each grouping if questions were deleted is attached as 
Appendix C. 
Trustworthiness and credibility.  Trustworthiness is defined as “a feature 
essential to the validity of qualitative research; is established by addressing the 
credibility, transferability, dependability, and confirmability of study findings” (Gay, et 
al., 2012, p. 632).  Credibility is a key element of trustworthiness and is established by 
how well the researcher was able to describe the topic and how accurately the 
information represented in the study matches what was expressed by the participants 
(Bloomberg & Volpe, 2016, p. 162). 
Trustworthiness and credibility can also be maintained through triangulation 
which involves the use of multiple sources or methods to provide a better understanding 
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and corroboration of the research data (Bloomberg & Volpe, 2016).  The mixed method 
design to be used for this study supports triangulation through the sequential use of 
quantitative methodology to acquire data followed by qualitative methodology to better 
understand the research problem (Creswell & Guetterman, 2019).  Mixed-methods 
triangulation allows for comparative analysis of qualitative data with quantitative data to 
determine consistency (Patton, 2015).  Comparison of the quantitative data gathered from 
the initial survey to the qualitative data gathered from the interviews and subsequent 
comparison to the inspection data acquired from the FAA provides triangulation and the 
basis for establishing trustworthiness and credibility of the research. 
Reflexivity and positionality.  Reflexivity is a self-conducted introspective 
review undertaken by researchers to understand the how and why they perceive, view, 
and interpret what they see and hear (Patton, 2015).  Understanding one’s own 
perspectives through self-reflection is critical to research since it can affect the gathering 
and analysis of data by introduction of bias (Patton, 2015).  Reflexivity in this study 
requires that researchers continually examined their actions through self-reflection 
throughout the research process.  (Bloomberg & Volpe, 2016).  Patton (2015) defines 
reflexivity as a form of self-reflection whereby qualitative researchers must look inward 
at themselves and consider how they have been affected by “cultural, political, social, 
linguistically, and economic origins” (p.70).  Reflexivity requires researchers to become 
self-aware so that they can understand what they know and how they came to know 
information (Patton, 2015).  This information is useful in qualitative research as it helps 
researchers recognize how they formed their own perspectives while also allowing them 
to recognize the perspectives of those under study (Patton, 2015). 
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Understanding reflexivity has made me realize that much of what I already know 
has influenced the selection of my research topic.  My previous work as a quality 
assurance specialist for a major U.S. airline has provided me with insight into known 
issues and problems.  Knowing these issues provided an advantage for designing a study 
that would focus on elements related to maintenance errors and what may cause those 
errors.  However, my prior knowledge may also adversely affect the study as it may blind 
me from seeing alternatives or becoming aware of perspectives held by the participants in 
my study.  It is possible that I might subconsciously assume that all the research 
participants and readers of the research report have similar backgrounds and experiences 
that I hold.  Having such a perception could impact the study by failing to fully explain or 
delineate certain concepts or outcomes.  Alternatively, participants and readers of this 
study may have different levels of knowledge that could lead them to different 
interpretations. 
As the researcher, I considered reflexivity throughout this study from the initial 
research design, development of instrumentation, gathering of survey data, and 
interviews through the final step involving data analysis to ensure that the perspectives of 
both participants and readers is maintained.  This included ensuring that the focus this 
study on maintenance errors and causes was on those noted by the FAA during their 
surveillance activities of the four largest air carriers in the U.S. during the FAA’s 2018 
fiscal year.  Maintenance errors and causes that may have been known to me but were not 
noted by the FAA or mentioned by any of the participants in this study were purposely 
omitted from this study. 
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Positionality is a consideration that qualitative researchers must consider 
regarding their interaction with participants.  A researcher may have insider knowledge 
of the working environment under study and this can have an effect on that researcher’s 
positionality with respect to the study (Merriam & Tisdell, 2016).  While having insider 
knowledge may help a researcher better understand the subject of the research and 
identify the sample population, it can be detrimental if the study participants become 
suspicious of the researcher’s motives perhaps thinking that the study is about them 
rather than the topic itself thus preventing the participants from speaking openly 
(Merriam & Tisdell, 2016).  It is also possible that a researcher’s positionality may be 
unintentionally introduced to the participants which could drive them to providing 
information that they believe would satisfy that researcher’s agenda (Merriam & Tisdell, 
2016). 
To control positionality and prevent my knowledge of the aviation industry from 
affecting the researcher-participant relationship, I refrained from discussing my prior 
knowledge and work history with the participants.  I introduced myself as a university 
student and discussed the topic of my study.  I focused on asking the interview questions 
as they were described in the list of semi-structured interview questions and encouraged 
the participants to explain some of their observations.  To ensure that the interviews were 
conducted with minimal interference from positionality, I allowed the participants to 
speak without influence and without acknowledging any knowledge I may have 
previously acquired from the industry.  Fortunately, none of the interview participants 
asked if I had worked in the aviation maintenance environment under study therefore, I 
was never placed into a position where I would have had to explain my background and 
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possibly influence the information provided to me by the participants.  Awareness that 
my prior background and knowledge has a direct impact on my positionality and the 
impact it may have on the study participants has enabled me to avoid such consequences 
through suppression of any comments or statements that might influence the qualitative 
data gathered for the study. 
Data Analysis 
The first research question for this study was addressed using quantitative data 
gathered by the survey.  This was supplemented by qualitative data from the three survey 
questions that elicited additional comments and the interviews where participants 
described what errors they have seen or experienced.  This generated information that 
was analyzed to identify the types of errors that are committed.  Information to answer 
the second research question was also obtained from quantitative data from the survey 
and the qualitative data provided by interviewed participants who were asked open-ended 
questions to provide further details regarding the causal factors for the errors that they 
had discussed.  The third research question is exploratory and participants were asked 
during the interview process to identify what actions they have witnessed that had been 
implemented and were successful in the prevention of the maintenance errors.  They were 
also asked for their opinions as to what other actions could have been taken to prevent 
such errors. 
The mixed-methods approach toward research using an explanatory sequential 
design required the use of three phases for data analysis: the first involved the analysis of 
quantitative data, the second required analysis of the qualitative data, and the third 
required an analysis of how the qualitative data explains the quantitative data and 
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answers the research questions (Creswell & Plano Clark, 2018).  Quantitative 
interpretation is defined as “summarizing the major quantitative results and then 
comparing the results with the initial research questions asked to determine how the 
questions or hypotheses were answered in the study” (Creswell & Plano Clark, 2018, p. 
216).  For this study, the survey results were analyzed to first identify what errors, casual 
factors and human factors are most prevalent for maintenance activities performed on 
aircraft operated by major airlines that have more than 70 seats.  It was possible to 
segregate this data from survey responses provided by participants engaged in 
maintenance activities other than that performed for major airlines due to the 
demographic survey questions that were answered by the participants.  Descriptive 
statistics were used to identify the frequency and central tendency to analyze the survey 
results (Creswell & Guetterman, 2019).  Analysis of Likert-type questions that have 
responses structured as ordinal measurement scales are best analyzed using frequencies to 
determine variability and by determining the mode to identify central tendency (Boone & 
Boone, 2012).  Frequency for each of the questions was determined by identifying the 
number of times a specific response to a question was chosen (Gay, et al., 2012).  
Measures of central tendency was measured by determining the mode which is the 
numerical response chosen more often by the participants than the other responses for 
each question (Gay, et al., 2012). 
Qualitative analysis was conducted by examination of the responses provided for 
the three open-text questions contained in the survey and of the data acquired through the 
interview process.  The detailed review of the raw data followed by categorizing of the 
data into patterns can reveal findings or trends (Patton, 2015).  Discovery of similar 
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patterns and themes from the interview data allowed for the identification and 
categorization the types of maintenance errors, the contributing factors, and preventative 
measures that have been or were recommended to prevent the errors.  The content 
analysis method was used for “identifying, organizing, and categorizing the content of 
narrative text” followed by the use of deductive analysis to “examining the data for 
illumination of predetermined sensitizing concepts or theoretical relationships” (Patton, 
2015, p. 551). 
The analysis of the quantitative data gathered during the first phase of this 
research provided the basis for further qualitative inquiry and the resultant qualitative 
data was then used to answer the research questions.  The volume of data generated by 
the participant surveys and interviews required a structured method to code the results for 
analytical review.  This was accomplished using Dedoose software provided by 
SocioCultural Research Consultants, LLC (2019) that allows for the importation of 
survey data from data collections programs such as Qualtrics and Survey Monkey for 
quantitative analysis in addition to manual entry provisions of the survey data.  The 
Dedoose program also accepted transcripts of interviews which were then coded and 
analyzed using the qualitative analytical visual display features provided by the program.  
The results of the data analysis for both the quantitative data and qualitative data were 
linked together in a joint display to provide a visual representation of how the qualitative 
findings support the quantitative results (Creswell & Plano Clark, 2018). 
Summary 
This study was conducted using a mixed-methods, explanatory sequential 
research design wherein research was conducted in two phases with the first focused on 
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the acquisition of quantitative data followed by a second phase that acquired qualitative 
data.  The participants for this study were identified as individuals who held a mechanic’s 
certificate issued by the FAA and who perform maintenance on aircraft having more than 
70 seats and are owned or operated by major airlines.  Purposeful selection was 
conducted from the total population of 270,000 FAA certificated mechanics domiciled in 
the United States to identify the sample population to 12,064 individuals that resided 
within 15 miles of the major airport maintenance hubs belonging to American Airlines, 
United Airlines, Delta Air Lines, and Southwest Airlines located in Tulsa, Oklahoma; 
Chicago, Illinois; Dallas, Texas; Ft. Worth, Texas; Atlanta, Georgia; and, Houston, 
Texas.  Random selection was performed to identify 1000 individuals each of whom were 
sent a request by USPS mail to participate in the study.  A total of 71 participants 
completed the surveys and of those, 48 participants met the selection criteria for inclusion 
in the first phase of the study.  Of these 48 participants, nine participants were 
interviewed for the second phase of the study. 
Data collection for the first phase of this study was accomplished using a survey 
comprised of 27 questions of which 21 were designed as Likert style questions using the 
same series of ordinal frequency-based responses to measure the occurrence of specific 
maintenance errors and causal factors.  The responses to these questions provided 
quantitative data for analysis using descriptive statistics to determine the predominance 
of certain errors and causal factors that were observed in the maintenance environment.  
The survey also included three open-ended questions which provided additional 
qualitative data for analysis.  The second phase of the study collected qualitative data 
from interviews conducted with nine of the survey participants.  The interviews were 
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conducted using a series of semi-structured open-ended questions designed to elicit 
greater detail regarding maintenance errors and causal factors known to the participants.  
The interviews were transcribed, and information was coded into categories and sub-
categories to provide data for qualitative analysis. 
The reliability and validity of the survey was initially performed through pre-
testing of the survey questions by test-subjects that held FAA mechanics certificates and 
worked for a major U.S airline.  The final draft of the survey incorporated changes as a 
result of the testing and test-subject comments.  Post reliability testing of the survey 
conducted on the responses provided by the participants to the 21 Likert style questions 
found that the Cronbach’s alpha was .915 indicating a high level of internal consistency.  
The testing was conducted again by separating the questions into two groups of 11 and 10 
which resulted in Cronbach’s alpha scores of .869 and .839 respectively indicating 
acceptable levels of internal consistency.  The validity and trustworthiness of the data 
was established through triangulation and analysis of consistency between the 
quantitative data and qualitative data gathered by this mixed-method study.   
Analysis of the quantitative data was performed using descriptive statistics to 
determine the predominate errors and causal factors as reported in the survey by the 
participants.  Qualitative data was analyzed by initially transcribing the participants’ 
interviews and coding the information into the Dedoose software platform.  The results 
from the analysis of the quantitative and qualitative data allowed for the identification of 
predominate maintenance errors and causal factors common to the performance of 








The findings from this mixed-methods study are presented in two sections.  The 
first section is focused on the findings relative to the quantitative and qualitative data 
gathered using the survey administered to the research participants.  The participants 
were asked to respond to 21 questions by selecting an appropriate response from a set of 
ordinal frequency-based responses that were repeated for each of the questions.  The 
survey consisted of 11 questions focused on maintenance errors, six questions focused on 
causes related to maintenance errors, and four questions pertaining to human factors that 
contribute to the commission of maintenance errors.  These results were analyzed using 
descriptive analysis techniques to determine which of the maintenance errors, causal 
factors and human factors are more prevalent than others from the participants’ 
perspectives.  Descriptive statistics used for the analysis of each question included the 
determination of the mode and the frequency for each of the response selections 
calculated as a percentage of the total responses for that question.  The survey also 
included three open-ended questions that allowed participants the ability to add additional 
comments relative to errors, causal factors, and human factors.  These comments are also 




The second section presents the findings that resulted from the interviews 
conducted of the nine participants who agreed to participate in the qualitative phase of 
this study.  Each participant was interviewed using a series of semi-structured questions 
that were designed to gather responses relative to specific errors known to that participant 
(See Appendix B).  The interviews were recorded, transcribed, and systematically coded 
to identify the types of maintenance errors, causal factors, human factors, and corrective 
action measures that were implemented.  Participants were also asked to identify 
additional corrective action measures they believe should have been taken to prevent the 
errors from recurring.  Although each error or incident as described by the participants 
was associated with one or more causal factors that impacted the error, this study does 
not attempt to define such associations.  The interview findings are presented as a 
qualitative review of errors and causal factors by category.  This is followed by a 
description of corrective action measures that had been implemented to mitigate 
particular errors along with suggested corrective actions as recommended by the 
participants. 
Survey Findings 
Maintenance Errors.  The results from the first section of the survey containing 
11 questions are tabulated and displayed in Table 1.  Analysis of descriptive statistics are 
based on the number of responses received for each question and adjusted for instances 
where survey participants chose not to respond.  Calculating the mode is accomplished by 
determining the response that was selected by the highest number of participants for each 
question (Gay, et al., 2012).  Identification of the mode helps establish a measure of 
central tendency or the middle score among a group of scores (Gay, et al., 2012).  The 
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first six questions were found to have a higher mode of three whereas the last five 
questions had a mode of two.  This indicates that the survey participants observed a 
greater frequency of errors with respect to the first six questions.  Closer review of the 
frequencies attributed to the responses for these six questions found that over 50 percent 
of participants indicated they selected Sometimes for having seen errors concerning the 
handling of maintenance documents, records, tags, forms, or placards; errors with the 
installation of parts or equipment; and errors regarding the completion of maintenance 
entries.  Of these three categories, errors with respect to the handling of maintenance 
documents, records, tags, forms, or placards was observed Regularly by 22.9 percent of 
the participants and Often by another 10.4 percent.  Errors related to the completion of 
maintenance entries were observed Regularly by 27.7 percent and Often by 8.5 percent of 





Frequency of Maintenance Errors 
 
Variable n Mode Never Rarely Sometimes Regularly Often n % n % n % n % n % 
Have seen errors with respect to 
the storage of parts and materials 48 3 4.2% 27.1% 47.9% 12.5% 8.3% 
 
Have seen errors with the content 
of maintenance instructions 
48 3 0.0% 20.8% 45.8% 25.0% 8.3% 
 
Have seen errors with the 
scheduling and / or control of the 
maintenance process 
48 3 2.1% 33.3% 39.6% 18.8% 6.3% 
 
Have seen errors with the 
handling of maintenance 
documents, records, tags, forms, 
or placards 
48 3 0.0% 16.7% 50.0% 22.9% 10.4% 
 
Have seen errors with the 
installation of parts or equipment 
48 3 2.1% 39.6% 52.1% 4.2% 2.1% 
 
Have seen errors with the 
completion of maintenance 
entries 
47 3 0.0% 12.8% 51.1% 27.7% 8.5% 
 
Have seen errors regarding 
maintenance steps or tasks 
performed using procedures that 
are not accepted or approved by 
the FAA 
47 2 21.3% 46.8% 27.7% 4.3% 0.0% 
 
Have seen errors regarding 
maintenance steps or tasks 
performed that deviate from 
written instructions or procedures 
47 2 8.5% 42.6% 42.6% 6.4% 0.0% 
 
Have seen errors regarding 
maintenance steps or tasks that 
were overlooked or not 
performed 
47 2 12.8% 44.7% 31.9% 10.6% 0.0% 
 
Have seen errors with the 
handling, usage, or control of 
calibrated tools and equipment 
48 2 18.8% 52.1% 22.9% 6.3% 0.0% 
 
Have seen errors with training 
requirements, recurrent training, 
or maintaining of qualifications 
for those assigned to perform 
maintenance 
48 2 12.5% 43.8% 29.2% 10.4% 4.2% 
Note. n = number of total responses received for the survey question; n % = the percentage of responses (n) received for each 
response; Mode = the most common response received for the survey question using numerators of 1 = Never, 2 = Rarely, 3 = 
Sometimes, 4 = Regularly, and 5 = Often.  
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It was noted that in addition to the three errors that had mid-point frequency 
distributions of over 50 percent, a fourth error related to the content of maintenance 
instructions was observed to have high frequency distributions at the far right of the 
frequency scale.  This error was seen Regularly by 25.0 percent of the participants and 
Often by 8.3 percent.  The data gathered by the survey is considered ordinal non-
parametric data and as such the precise interval between each of the responses is un-
defined.  However, by calculating the total percentage of survey participants that 
answered each question with a selection of Sometimes, Regularly or Often, the top three 
errors observed by the majority of participants become more apparent and were identified 
in order of percentages as follows: 
87.3 percent Errors observed with the completion of maintenance entries 
83.3 percent Errors observed with the handling of maintenance documents, 
records, tags, forms, or placards 
79.1 percent Errors observed with the content of maintenance instructions 
Participant Comments Regarding Maintenance Errors.  The 12th question on 
the survey asked participants to list other types of maintenance errors that they may have 
observed and to comment on how likely these errors occur during the performance of 
maintenance.  Eighteen participants provided comments although the majority of the 
comments related to causal factors and not the identification of other types of errors.  The 
comments attributed to causal factors were subsequently added to the data discussed in 
later sub-sections of this study related to causal factors and human factors. 
There were no comments that identified errors not already included in the survey, 
but several of the comments provided examples of certain errors for consideration.  One 
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survey participant commented that “confirmation checks or required inspection check 
items [were] being completed by the same individual or not completed at all, sometimes.”  
The survey did not include a specific question related to the observation of errors 
committed by a person who completes tasks that were intended for completion others.  
However, this observation can be classified as an extension of errors associated with 
maintenance steps or tasks that were overlooked or not performed specifically if the 
secondary inspections were required to be performed by a different individual.  
Alternatively, the observation can be associated with maintenance errors associated with 
the performance of maintenance steps or tasks that deviate from written instructions or 
procedures given that it was not completed precisely as noted in those instructions.  The 
error itself is significant as it illustrates that a key maintenance task that requires a second 
individual to verify the work performed by another was not performed. 
Another participant stated “the issue I have seen is mostly with unlicensed 
mechanics who use tribal knowledge without manual reference.  Often these people don't 
know how to look it up and fail probably 80 percent of the time to check aircraft 
effectivity.”  This observation can be associated with several of the errors noted in the 
survey including errors associated with training requirements, errors with the 
performance of maintenance tasks that deviate from instructions, and errors concerning 
the installation of parts and materials.  What is significant regarding the comment is the 
observation relates to the use of unlicensed mechanics that perform maintenance for 
major air carriers.  The content of the survey was targeted toward the sample population 
of licensed mechanics and did not include questions regarding the actions of unlicensed 
mechanics.  Although this study was not focused on this population of individuals, it is 
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noted that errors identified in the survey can also be committed by maintenance personnel 
who are unlicensed individuals. 
An example was provided for an error related to maintenance steps or tasks 
performed that deviate from written instructions and procedures.  The survey participant 
commented: 
Maintenance instructions are for the most restrictive of tasks i.e... pull circuit 
breakers (multiple) when powering down aircraft accomplished [the] same tasks 
much quicker.  You are still removing power but in a different manner.  I have 
seen FAA Inspectors issue a violation against AMTs because they didn't follow 
[the manual] "exactly".  Example is the fault isolation manual, FAA Inspectors 
violate AMTs regularly because they do not replace the components listed in the 
order of the FIM manual.  Most Fault Isolation Manuals are "constantly" under 
revision due to errors and inaccuracies. 
This comment is of interest as it describes errors related to the performance of 
work that deviates from published instructions.  However, the comment also illustrates 
that errors exist with the maintenance instructions themselves which may lack alternative 
methods that can be used to perform maintenance tasks or may list instructions that are 
out of sequence to the steps necessary to perform maintenance.  The comment also notes 
that deviation from published manuals or failure to follow the specific sequence of steps 
in the instructions have resulted in the issuance of compliance actions by the FAA. 
Causal Factors.  The results from the second section of the survey containing six 
questions related to what may cause maintenance errors are tabulated and displayed in 
Table 2.  Using the same methodology used to analyze error categories, the causal factors 
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were also analyzed and frequencies displayed with calculations based on the number of 
responses for each question and adjusted for questions to which some participants may 
have chosen not to respond.  Four of the six questions were found to have a mode of three 
whereas the other two questions had a mode of two.  However, examination of the 
response frequencies for the two questions that had a mode of two found that one 
question received high frequency responses of Regularly and Often that was comparable 
to similar response frequencies for the four causal factor questions that were found to 






Frequency of Maintenance Error Causal Factors 
 
Variable n Mode Never Rarely Sometimes Regularly Often n % n % n % n % n % 
Policies and procedures that are 
inadequate, lack sufficient detail, 
or do not contain current 
information cause maintenance 
errors 
48 3 8.3% 37.5% 41.7% 10.4% 2.1% 
 
Failure to follow instructions or 
procedural requirements cause 
maintenance errors 
48 3 4.2% 39.6% 43.8% 10.4% 2.1% 
 
Ineffective controls over the 
maintenance process or the lack 
of a measurement process cause 
maintenance errors 
47 2 10.6% 55.3% 25.5% 6.4% 2.1% 
 
Maintenance and process 
instructions that contain 
inaccurate information or lacked 
sufficient detail cause 
maintenance errors 
48 3 12.5% 35.4% 39.6% 2.1% 10.4% 
 
Maintenance personnel lacking 
sufficient training or knowledge 
cause maintenance errors 
48 2 8.3% 37.5% 31.3% 10.4% 12.5% 
 
Failure to make maintenance 
entries or omitting relevant 
information in logbooks, 
maintenance records, or other 
record keeping documents cause 
maintenance errors 
48 3 16.7% 33.3% 37.5% 8.3% 4.2% 
Note. n = number of total responses received for the survey question; n % = the percentage of responses (n) received for each 
response; Mode = the most common response received for the survey question using numerators of 1 = Never, 2 = Rarely, 3 = 




Prioritization using the mode alone was insufficient to identify the primary cause 
of maintenance errors.  Selecting the causal factor having the highest percentage 
calculated for the mid-point frequency selection of Sometimes would not take into 
consideration the high response percentages allocated to the greater frequency responses 
for Regularly and Often.  Therefore, the six causal factors were ranked in order from high 
to low by totaling the frequency percentages allocated to the selections of Sometimes, 
Regularly, and Often by the participants in the survey. 
56.3 percent Failure to follow instructions or procedural requirements. 
54.2 percent Policies and procedures that are inadequate, lack sufficient detail, 
or do not contain current information. 
54.2 percent Maintenance personnel lacking sufficient training or knowledge. 
52.1 percent Maintenance and process instructions that contain inaccurate 
information or lacked sufficient detail. 
50.0 percent Failure to make maintenance entries or omitting relevant 
information in logbooks, maintenance records, or other record 
keeping documents. 
34.0 percent Ineffective controls over the maintenance process or the lack of a 
measurement process. 
The totalization of frequency percentages for the mid to high frequency responses 
selected by the participants illustrate that, with the except of the causal factor regarding 
ineffective controls over the maintenance process or the lack of a measurement process, 
all other causal factors were equally identified as responsible for maintenance errors. 
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Participant Comments Regarding Causal Factors.  An open-ended question 
was included in the survey immediately following the causal factor questions that 
prompted participants to list any other causal factors that they may have observed and to 
comment on how likely the causes contributed to maintenance errors.  Although none of 
the comments revealed causal factors that were not already identified in the survey, the 
comments provided further details and qualitative data that illustrated the impact some of 
the causal factors have on aircraft maintenance. 
A comment related to the failure to follow instructions or procedural requirements 
was attributed by a participant to instances when a mechanic is “rushing through a job 
and not reading all of the instructions”.  The pressure to complete work assignments was 
also cited by another survey participant who noted “members of management have 
pressured people in order to maintain schedule resulting in errors”.  A third survey 
participant provided another comment that errors can result from pressures exerted on the 
mechanic: 
The error comes from the pressure put upon a technician by supervision, to 
perform a job with improper tooling, resulting in damage to the aircraft, or 
personnel injury to the technician.  This is not a widespread problem, but a 
problem, just the same, that still happens more than this technician cares for. 
With respect to maintenance and process instructions that contain inaccurate 
information or lacked sufficient detail, one participant acknowledged that the 
introduction and assignment of a new modification to an aircraft can result in multiple 
errors with the instructions, all of which require correction as they are discovered.  This 
type of causal factor was echoed by another participant who noted that inaccurate 
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information or lack of sufficient detail is the result of “poorly written MX [maintenance] 
procedures written by someone who has no MX [maintenance] experience”.  Other 
survey participants voiced additional concerns that too much information added to the 
maintenance and process instructions cause errors and confusion.  For instance, one 
participant noted a practice whereby one air carrier creates and incorporates consolidated 
listings of multiple manufacturer part numbers into the maintenance instructions and this 
created confusion that has led to the installation of incorrect parts on aircraft by 
mechanics who relied on these instructions as the authority for eligibility.  Another 
survey participant commented that part installation errors were partly due to “illegal parts 
due to incorrect substitutions during the purchasing process”. 
Problems are not only limited to the contents of maintenance manuals but can 
extend to higher level airline policy manuals.  One survey participant noted that “policies 
and procedures are so elaborate and convoluted that it is difficult to keep up with it when 
it should (must) be included in applicable maintenance manual or job card”. 
Other comments regarding the cause of maintenance errors were directed towards 
issues where maintenance personnel lack sufficient training or knowledge.  One 
participant noted that “training requirements are given ‘extreme latitude’ by the airlines 
and they take every advantage to reduce costs by getting the absolute minimums 
approved”.  This observation coincides with another survey participant’s view regarding 
how an airline selects its mechanics: 
Usually, the training and knowledge that is lacking is due to using HR, [Human 
Resources] who know absolutely nothing about aircraft maintenance, to decide 
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who moves forward in the hiring process.  Combine that with minimum training 
requirements for aircraft types after hiring = [equals] errors. 
The training process itself was the subject of a comment made by a survey 
participant who noted that those who conduct training may have ulterior motives 
regarding the completion of the training assignment: “When the training process is 
performed by peers that have a vested interest in the grading and documentation of the 
training then there is a major gap between what is being taught and what actually is 
learned”.   This was further supported by comment from another survey participant who 
wrote “the training department's interest is getting the name and employee number on a 
document that shows the employee knows the information”.  Together, these comments 
reflect that the effectiveness of maintenance training given to maintenance personnel is 
impacted by training instructors who are more interested in the completion of the 
assignment rather than the training itself.  The skill level of mechanics was also noted by 
a survey participant who commented: 
The ability of the mechanic to look up the repair for the right aircraft is a big 
problem.  Also, many workers can't read an electrical drawing or blueprint.  You 
would be surprised to see how many maintenance workers can't properly use a 
simple volt ohm meter…. classroom training isn't enough.  There should be 100 
percent pass of the proper use of common tools.  There should be follow-up 
training by the shop Tech Crew Chiefs after classroom instruction. 
Mechanics are affected by more than just the lack of maintenance specific 
training.  A comment was submitted by a survey participant which noted the “failure to 
understand and use proper grammar, and an overall lack of knowledge of the use of the 
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English language causes inaccurate and incomplete documentation of corrective actions 
taken to address discrepancies”.  Although English is the universal language recognized 
for most aviation activities including maintenance, the participant’s comment regarding 
comprehension for those to whom English is a second or third language is an area of 
concern that was not addressed by this research.  However, it is a logical observation that 
those who may not fully comprehend the English language may require additional 
training to avoid misinterpretation of maintenance instructions or errors documenting 
repairs. 
Proper training of maintenance personnel is essential to avoid the commission of 
errors during aircraft maintenance.  One survey participant summarized this on the survey 
by stating that “poorly trained mechanics in a fast-paced environment leads to the 
majority of the mistakes”.  Training issues may also have roots that predate the hiring of 
mechanics by major U.S. air carriers as noted by a survey participant who submitted this 
comment: 
I've witnessed way too many A&P technicians that lack the skill and competency 
to be working on any kind of aircraft. I often wonder how these techs even get 
through the aircraft maintenance schools and obtain an FAA airframe and 
powerplant license. 
Human Factors.  The results from the third section of the survey containing four 
questions regarding the frequency that each human factor contributes to maintenance 
errors is displayed in Table 3.  As with the descriptive statistics related to maintenance 
errors and causal factors, the calculations are based on the number of responses for each 
question that were adjusted for instances where participants preferred not to respond.  
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The descriptive statistics noted that the questions for all four of the listed human errors 
resulted in responses with a mode of three.  However, the four questions had different 
frequency response rate percentages particularly for the three higher response rates of 
Sometimes, Regularly, and Often. 
Table 3 
 
Frequency of Human Errors that Induce Maintenance Errors 
 
Variable n Mode Never Rarely Sometimes Regularly Often n % n % n % n % n % 
Lack of awareness cause 
maintenance errors 48 3 2.1% 37.5% 52.1% 4.2% 4.2% 
 
Complacency cause maintenance 
errors 
48 3 2.1% 20.8% 45.8% 22.9% 8.3% 
 
Distractions cause maintenance 
errors 
47 3 0.0% 25.5% 59.6% 14.9% 0.0% 
 
Lack of attention cause 
maintenance errors 
47 3 0.0% 27.7% 57.4% 12.8% 2.1% 
Note. n = number of total responses received for the survey question; n % = the percentage of responses (n) received for each 
response; Mode = the most common response received for the survey question using numerators of 1 = Never, 2 = Rarely, 3 = 
Sometimes, 4 = Regularly, and 5 = Often. 
 
To provide some degree of prioritization between the four human factors addressed in the 
survey, they were ranked in order from high to low in accordance with the total of the 
response rate percentages allocated to participant selections of Sometimes, Regularly, and 
Often. 
77.0 percent Complacency cause maintenance errors 
72.3 percent Lack of attention cause maintenance errors 
64.5 percent Distractions cause maintenance errors 
60.5 percent Lack of awareness cause maintenance errors 
Comparing the total percentage of participants who observed these human factors at 
higher frequencies of Sometimes or greater illustrates that complacency and lack of 
attention were identified by the survey participants as the two key factors that caused or 
contributed to maintenance errors.  However, the remaining two human factors must be 
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considered equally important given that over 50 percent of the respondents indicated that 
they are also contribute to errors at frequencies of Sometimes or higher. 
Participant Comments Regarding Human Factors:  Participants in the survey 
were asked to identify additional human factors that they believe cause or contribute to 
maintenance errors.  One participant cited physical and environmental factors such as 
“fatigue or heat or working too many hours” can cause mechanics to “not follow written 
instructions carefully”.  Several participants identified that the lack of morale, stress, or 
pressure to accomplish tasks is also a contributor to errors. 
Examples to support the effect that certain human factors have on the 
performance of maintenance were provided as written comments on the survey.  
Regarding distractions, one survey participant stated maintenance work is regularly 
affected by “several outside vendors that create distractions in the workplace”.  Another 
participant mentioned that “when entertainment devices such as television, laptops and 
video players are allowed in work areas there is bound to be lapses in concentration”.  
Lack of attention was illustrated with another survey participant’s comment that 
mechanics were “doing the work like they did at a previous employer, but not following 
[the policies of] the new employer who follows the manual instructions”. 
Complacency was the subject of several emphatic comments submitted by survey 
participants.  One participant stated: “Complacency! Attitude of ‘that's how we've always 
done it.’ is common in aviation MX [maintenance]”.  Another survey participant 
commented: “Ignorance causes most errors in any workplace. LOOK IT UP, AND IF 





Maintenance Errors.  Coding and analysis of the maintenance errors recounted 
by the participants during the interviews noted that there were eight instances of 
maintenance errors related to the installation of parts followed by four instances related to 
the storage and handling of parts.  Other errors included three instances related to the 
performance of maintenance steps or tasks that deviate from written instructions or 
procedures, three instances where maintenance steps or tasks were not preformed or 
overlooked, three errors with the content of maintenance instructions, two errors 
concerning the scheduling and/or control of the maintenance process, one error with the 
completion of maintenance entries, and two maintenance related errors that fell outside of 
the categories listed in the original survey.  No errors were mentioned by the participants 
with respect to the handling of maintenance documents, records, tags, forms, or placards; 
errors with maintenance steps or tasks performed using procedures that are not accepted 
or approved by the FAA; errors with the handling, usage, or control of calibrated tools 
and equipment; or errors with respect to training requirements.  The following is a 
description of the errors sorted by classification and paraphrased according to the 
comments provided by the participants: 
Errors related to the installation of parts. 
• Flight augmentation computers were not properly secured in the aircraft 
electronics compartment and had slid out of their mounting racks during flight 
(Participant A). 
• A brake anti-skid module had been installed on the aircraft with its two high 
pressure hydraulic lines reversed (Participant B). 
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• Installation errors were made with the attachment of the ground shielding 
wiring for the wing slat proximity sensors (Participant E). 
• A flight control actuator fitting was mis-drilled during installation onto the 
aircraft (Participant F). 
• A structural support doubler was mis-drilled during installation on the 
fuselage (Participant F). 
• A hydraulic actuator failed a pressure test due to an o-ring that had been 
installed in the incorrect order (Participant G). 
• Incorrectly sized hardware was installed to secure the anti-ice ducting to the 
engine nose cowling (Participant G). 
• An incorrect elevator/aileron control computer was installed on an aircraft that 
had been previously modified for a different version of the computer 
(Participant H). 
Errors related to the storage of parts and materials. 
• Serviceable and unserviceable parts were comingled in the same storage bins 
(Participant G). 
• Hoses, lines, and other parts with openings were not stored with protective 
caps or covers over the openings (Participant G). 
• Movement of hoses and tubing from one location to another was performed 




• Hardware and other parts, some of which were unidentified or from different 
manufacturing lots, were comingled together in storage bins and drawers 
(Participant G & H). 
Errors related to the deviation from instructions or procedures. 
• Elevator free-play checks were performed to airline instructions which 
deviated from the manufacturer’s instructions (Participant C). 
• Procedures were not followed during push-back of an aircraft from the 
maintenance hangar resulting in a tow bar disconnect (Participant C). 
• An aircraft was operated with two aircraft spoilers that had been placed into a 
maintenance configuration instead of operational configuration as required by 
the maintenance instructions (Participant H). 
Errors related to steps or tasks not preformed or overlooked. 
• Wing to body fairing fasteners were not torqued upon installation as required 
by the aircraft maintenance instructions (Participant D). 
• Failure to release the main landing gear oleo strut pressure in accordance with 
instructions prior to removal and partial disassembly of the landing gear 
(Participant E). 
• Circuit breakers had been pulled in addition to others specified by the 
maintenance instructions and were not reset following maintenance. 
(Participant H). 
Errors related to the content of maintenance instructions.  
• A lavatory door hinge pin that was discovered to have protruded through the 
top of the fuselage had not been previously inspected due to maintenance 
 
79 
instructions that limited inspection to the lower lavatory door hinge pin 
(Participant C). 
• Work card instructions that had been re-written into a different format were 
found to contained numerous errors (Participant F). 
• Instructions were not broken down far enough to cover all the steps required 
to perform the maintenance task (Participant I). 
Errors related to the scheduling/control of the maintenance process. 
• An aircraft that was not qualified for Extended Twin-Engine Operations 
Performance Standards (ETOPS) was scheduled and flown on an extended 
over-water flight (Participant A). 
• Aircraft scheduled for repetitive inspections had over-flown the dates or flight 
hours on which the inspections were due (Participant A). 
Errors with the completion of maintenance entries. 
• Maintenance personnel signed for the accomplishment of an ETOPS 
inspection in the logbook for a non-ETOPS aircraft (Participant A). 
Other maintenance related errors not categorized. 
• A mechanic operating a tug was pulling an aircraft out of the hangar and ran 
the wing tip into the side of the hangar (Participant F). 
• A composite flight control being cured under pressure in an autoclave was 
damaged when the vacuum bag surrounding it ruptured (Participant I). 
Causal Factors.  Coding and analysis of causal factors was performed using 
information gathered during the interview process.  Each of the participants were asked to 
comment as to the causal factors related to the maintenance errors they had discussed.  
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Some of the participants provided multiple causal factors for each error therefore each 
causal factor was independently coded for this study.  They were also asked to identify 
any outside factors beyond those described in the initial survey that they believe 
contributed to the errors.  There were 11 reported instances where errors were caused by 
maintenance and process instructions that contained inaccurate information or lacked 
sufficient detail.  Nine instances were reported where the failure to follow instructions or 
procedural requirements contributed to the errors.  Five instances were reported where 
the lack of training or knowledge contributed to the maintenance errors.  One instance 
was described where the lack of controls over the maintenance process was responsible 
for an error.  No instances were reported of causal factors related to the omission or 
failure to make maintenance entries or causal factors related to the inadequacies of 
policies and procedures.  However, there were five instances of causal factors mentioned 
by participants that do not fit the elements previously identified on the survey.  The 
following are paraphrased descriptions of the causal factors provided by the participants 
and sorted by classification: 
Instructions that are inaccurate or have insufficient information. 
• The sequence used for torquing a bolt on an elevator and measuring free play 
was incorrect and did not match instructions published by the manufacturer 
(Participant C). 
• Inspection instructions did not include the requirement to inspect the upper 
lavatory hinge pin for migration (Participant C). 
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• Procedures for pushback of aircraft following maintenance at the hangar failed 
to address the difference of procedures to be followed when pushback is 
accomplished by a Captain instead of a mechanic (Participant C). 
• Work card was incorrectly titled and used to inspect the main landing gear 
axle damage for impact damage although the work card instructions were 
specifically written for overheat damage to the axle (Participant D). 
• Work card in use by mechanics was found to have multiple errors that 
required work stoppage until it could be revised with instructions that could be 
followed by the mechanics (Participant F). 
• The assembly illustrations for the hydraulic actuator showed the assembly of 
the o-rings and seals in the wrong sequence (Participant G). 
• Minimum Equipment List (MEL) procedures regarding the lock-out of 
spoilers contained general information and lacked concise maintenance 
instructions specific to the lock-out of a specific spoiler set (Participant H). 
• Illustrated Parts Catalogs (IPCs) contained superseded part numbers and parts 
not applicable to the airline’s fleet which caused confusion (Participant H). 
• Maintenance manuals were not revised in a timely manner to preclude the use 
of outdated information by mechanics (Participant I). 
• Work Cards contained complex maintenance instructions that required work 
from multiple mechanics over several shifts to complete.  However, the 
instructions on the work cards lacked enough space for individual mechanics 
to sign for the work they had accomplished (Participant I). 
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• Maintenance check card instructions were written out of sequence compared 
to how the maintenance work was accomplished on the aircraft (Participant I). 
Failure to follow instructions or procedural requirements. 
• The mechanic that installed the flight augmentation computers failed to follow 
the maintenance instructions which required that the computers be locked into 
place upon installation to the aircraft (Participant A). 
• High pressure hydraulic lines were reversed when installed to the brake anti-
skid module in contrast to the correct instructions noted in the maintenance 
manual and illustrations (Participant B). 
• Mechanic failed to depressurize the correct aircraft hydraulic system in 
accordance with maintenance procedures prior to towing the aircraft 
(Participant C). 
• Mechanics installed wing to fuselage fairings using an impact gun and failed 
to torque screws after installation as required by the maintenance manual 
(Participant D). 
• The left main landing gear strut was not depressurized completely in 
accordance with the maintenance instructions before the landing gear was 
partially disassembled for removal from the aircraft (Participant E). 
• Mechanic that was pushing an aircraft out of the hangar did not follow 
procedures causing substantial damage to the aircraft. (Participant F). 
• Mechanics had installed the wrong fasteners before discovering that the 
maintenance manual had been previously revised to identify the correct 
hardware (Participant G). 
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• Circuit breakers were not re-configured or re-set after completion of work in 
accordance with maintenance manual requirements (Participant H). 
• Incorrect elevator aileron control computer was installed on an aircraft 
contrary to specific notes in the illustrated parts catalogue (IPC) that identified 
the specific computers that were eligible for installation on aircraft that had or 
had not been modified (Participant H). 
Lack of training or knowledge. 
• Lack of training on how to access various maintenance manuals and IPCs to 
determine correct part numbers and effectivity to an aircraft (Participant H). 
• Shop mechanics not normally assigned to aircraft overhaul are required to 
take computer-based training on certain aircraft systems such as emergency 
slides but lack familiarity and intimate knowledge to perform the work when 
temporarily re-assigned to perform such maintenance on the aircraft 
(Participant I). 
• The mechanic that failed to depressurize the landing gear strut prior to 
removal from the aircraft may not have been properly trained (Participant E). 
• Mechanics that had difficulty attaching the ground shielding on wires for the 
slat proximity sensors lacked skills gained through experience regarding the 
amount of shielding to cut back and how much heat to apply (Participant E). 
• The older age of the workforce will drive many to retire, and the airlines will 
be losing the knowledge held by those individuals.  New mechanics that are 
mentored by some of the older mechanics may have been taught bad habits 
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which they may follow unless the newer mechanics are re-educated or 
educated correctly when they are initially hired (Participant B). 
Ineffective or lack of controls over the maintenance process. 
• Existing controls to ensure that aircraft are re-inspected at required intervals at 
through stations or overnight stations were ineffective (Participant A). 
Other causal factors that were not categorized. 
• Management’s push to have work completed quickly leads to mechanics 
taking shortcuts while performing maintenance (Participant B). 
• Lack of computers and printers or equipment that is broken prevents 
mechanics from accessing maintenance instructions or printing copies which 
contribute to the commission of errors (Participant B and Participant H). 
• Upper management’s focus on expediting work accomplishment can cause 
mechanics to avoid spending time reading the maintenance instructions 
(Participant D). 
• Mis-drilled holes in fittings and doublers were caused by human error 
(Participant F). 
• Unavailability of protective end caps, plugs, and fittings contribute to errors 
involving the storage and handling of hoses, tubes and other parts with un-
covered ports and openings (Participant G). 
Human Factors.  The participants were asked to identify any human factors that 
they believe contributed to the errors that they had discussed during the interview.  The 
comments provided were coded into four human factors categories previously listed in 
the survey.  Many of the comments were directed toward complacency followed by lack 
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of attention and lack of awareness.  Distractions were not cited by the interview 
participants, but several commented that stressful conditions imposed by time constraints 
and management oversight drove some to take short cuts while performing maintenance.  
Stress was not one of the categories identified in the survey, but comments attributed to it 
are identified and reported as a separate category for non-categorized human factors. 
Complacency.  Several participants cited complacency as a significant human 
factor that contributed to the commission of errors.  They attributed the repetitive nature 
and simplicity of the maintenance tasks as the element which would drive a mechanic 
toward complacency.  While describing an error that resulted in aircraft damage, 
Participant F commented that complacency results from the “kind of task you do day in 
and day out” and “I’ve done this 100 times”.  This reasoning agrees with similar 
comments made by Participant D who stated: 
Unless it’s some AD driven task, if a mechanic is doing something over and over 
and over again, they will not consult the manual.  That would be like tire changes.  
I know it’s wrong, but sometimes I do get it.  If you were to use the manual every 
single time, it would take you 10 times longer to do some things.  That is a very, 
very common thing for repetitive tasks, not to look it up (Participant D). 
Familiarity with repetitive maintenance tasks drives complacency with respect to the 
need to review the manual instructions prior to performing the tasks.  Avoiding the 
review of the maintenance tasks is seen as the means to save considerable time expended 
to complete the maintenance tasks.  This attitude was also described by another 
participant who commented: 
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I think a lot of times it’s just a time factor.  It takes time to look that stuff up and 
even if you have a simple task in front of you, it’s real [sic] easy to just take it 
apart, see the broken or worn part, replace it, and put the same or equivalent 
fasteners back in it that you took out (Participant G). 
The amount of time required to review maintenance instructions can drive mechanics to 
read certain sections of the maintenance instructions and skip others.  Participant H offers 
an example of how haste can cause a mechanic to miss important information: 
I think it’s haste.  I think a lot of it’s being in a hurry.  There’s [sic] some very 
sharp guys out there.  They maybe are too sharp, I’ll put it this way.  And they’re 
like, “Okay that makes sense for me to pull the circuit breaker and leave it open, 
so we’re good there, and I don’t need to read that last part.  Last part is a bunch of 
cautions,” and I know because I’ve done it too before in the past. “I know better.  
That’s just a disclaimer at the end so I’m not going to read that.”  I think that’s 
what it comes down to.  Guys just kind of overthink, they assume.  And I’ve done 
it.  I’ve probably made similar mistakes.  They look at the last paragraph as the 
fine print (Participant H). 
Complacency is also driven by the content of the maintenance instructions and 
part catalogs.  Participant H noted that the proliferation of modification programs on 
some aircraft has affected the installation eligibility of parts for those modified aircraft.  
Mechanics that look for the replacement part in the parts catalog and are confronted with 
multiple notes that limit the installation of certain part numbers to different aircraft based 
on modification status.  For an airline with a fleet of aircraft that includes one type of 
aircraft but at different modification levels, it can be difficult to determine the correct 
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replacement part for each aircraft.  Participant H commented that mechanics are not “See 
Note A, See Note B, See Note C type people.”  They can get “worn out from that and 
they say, ‘yeah, yeah, yeah, It’s the right one. It’s the right one.’ and they’ll install that 
[incorrect] part, and that was happening a lot”. 
Lack of attention.  Several participants provided information which could be 
categorized as lack of attention which would likely contribute to some of the errors 
discussed during the interviews.  For instance, although the specific causal factor could 
not be determined as to what may have caused the vacuum bag surrounding the flight 
control in the autoclave to burst and damage the flight control, it was suggested that it 
could have been a lack of attention due to the repetitive nature of the bagging process: “I 
think its lack of attention that you just didn’t pay enough attention to the stress points, the 
critical, I say critical…. points where the bag will fail if you don’t get it protected 
properly” (Participant I).  
Some errors may have various contributing factors such as the error involving the 
failure to release the pressure from the main landing gear strut before its partial 
disassembly and removal from the aircraft.  In this instance, the maintenance card was 
comprised of approximately 200 pages and included a specific step to deplete the 
pressure.  The participant surmised that there may have been several factors which 
affected the individual who was responsible for the task: 
The only thing I can think of is that either the person wasn’t properly trained, or 
when they were being trained, they didn’t pay attention carefully as to exactly 
what to do, or they did not read the AMM, aircraft maintenance manual, very 
carefully (Participant E). 
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A mechanic’s lack of attention together with complacency can lead to significant 
errors.  This was a likely combination that existed with an error described by Participant 
A, who described an error with a non-ETOPS aircraft that was inspected and released for 
an over-water ETOPS flight.  The process to release the aircraft required the completion 
of a pre-departure check where maintenance personnel must walk around the aircraft and 
perform inspections culminating in the signing of the logbook.  This was accomplished 
despite the absence of emergency aircraft equipment such as additional life rafts and a 
hydraulic driven generator.  As for why this occurred, the participant commented: 
Maintenance wise?  They were probably just “Okay, let’s get it done”, and they 
went out and did it.  But I don’t know how they could have done it without 
signing the blocks that they checked all the emergency equipment because it 
wasn’t all there.  So, I just think as far as maintenance goes, it’s not outside 
factors, it’s all just basically human error; being lackadaisy, “Hey, here’s our 
flight. Let’s go do it,” and they don’t double check everything.  They just go 
through, “Yep, yep, yep, yep, okay here it is. Sign it off.”  They didn’t really 
check it (Participant A). 
The human error described by Participant A provides an example where lack of attention 
and complacency acting together can cause an error.  Clear determination of one human 
factor over another as the primary causal factor of an error may be problematic in some 
situations. 
Lack of awareness.  While most of the human factors mentioned by the 
participants focused on complacency and lack of attention, lack of awareness was 
mentioned as one of the factors that contribute to the commission of errors.  Participant D 
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noted that some mechanics become dependent on work cards and air carrier developed 
maintenance instructions for the work scope.  As a result, they become unaware of that 
they should be reviewing the aircraft maintenance manual (AMM) to retrieve additional 
information that supplements the work cards issued for the task.  This was explained as a 
possible contributor for an error that was committed when a landing gear wheel and brake 
assembly was removed and caused impact damage to the axle.  The cause of the damage 
was the failure to use the proper tool to protect the axle, but an additional error was made 
during the inspection of the axle after it was damaged.  Rather than looking at the AMM 
for damage tolerance and repair instructions, the mechanics relied on the use of an 
inspection work card originally written for heat damage to the axle, not impact damage.  
The mechanics relied on the applicability of the work card due in part to its title which 
simply referred to axle damage.  Lack of awareness regarding the need to review other 
manuals for specific instructions and perhaps lack of awareness on the part of the work 
card author who used a generic title on a work card specific for one type of axle damage 
were contributors to the error. 
Other Factors.  Several interview participants commented that there were 
additional human related factors that contributed to some of the errors they had described.  
These factors include stress related situations encountered by mechanics, physical issues, 
and working conditions affecting the mechanics while they were performing repairs.  
Stress placed upon the mechanic to quickly return the aircraft to service was one such 
factor shared by several participants.  This was previously mentioned with errors that 
were associated with complacency but is some instances stress can be the root cause of 
errors.  The stress from pressure driving the need to complete a maintenance task was 
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noted by Participant F who described an error made by a mechanic that rendered a 
$20,000 hydraulic actuator fitting unusable when it was mis-drilled: 
In this case, he might have felt some pressure and I mean pressure like, “Hey, 
how long is it going to take you to do this?” That kind of thing.  In the back of 
your mind and you know you work for an airline, there’s always that little bit of 
pressure that, “I need to get this done.  Because we need the airplane, the airplane 
needs to go fly” (Participant F). 
Similar thoughts were expressed by Participant A who noted that pressure to get aircraft 
back into service is something that mechanics working for an airline experience: 
I would say again, you’ve got the push from management, “Hurry up, get this 
plane done.  We need to get it on the flight line.”  Like I said, you always have 
that push going to get this plane ready for flight in the morning.  I mean, that 
could be a contributing factor (Participant A). 
The perception that time is of the essence in the airline maintenance environment 
can affect something as simple as storing unserviceable parts removed from aircraft or 
components.  Such a situation was noted by Participant G who stated: 
It’s people in a hurry coupled with maybe there’s not a drawer for unserviceable 
[parts], for that unserviceable component, but there is for serviceable ones, so you 
just put it in the drawer so at least you know where it is.  It might be wrong but 
that’s sometimes what ends up happening.  I think guys just get in a hurry.  Time 
always seems of the essence, you know.  When you don’t have quite everything 
you need sometimes, you just cut corners and that’s just a fact in the industry, 
unfortunately (Participant G). 
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The older age of mechanics and familiarity with new technology can be a 
contributing factor for maintenance errors.  One participant commented that older 
mechanics may find they are at a disadvantage regarding their ability to access 
computerized maintenance instructions:  
The average age of the mechanics where I work is probably 59 years old.  So, 
sometimes their familiarity with computerized maintenance manuals and such is 
not the best that it could be.  Because they didn’t grow up with the technology 
(Participant B). 
Environmental conditions were also cited as a factor that can induce mistakes.  
Participant E noted that environmental conditions could have played a role with the 
partial disassembly and removal of the main landing gear from the aircraft.  While the 
specific error was traced to failure to completely release the pneumatic pressure in the 
main landing gear strut prior to removal and disassembly, the participant added: 
Just that it was just really hot… and summers here are so hot, and our hangars are 
heated in the winter, but they’re not air conditioned in the summer.  So, people get 
a little bit tired of the heat and they maybe get a little bit sloppy or whatever 
(Participant E). 
The time of day the work is performed is yet another environmental factor that 
can contribute to errors.  Participant B identified that the mechanics that worked on the 
original installation of the anti-skid module where the two hydraulic lines were installed 




First of all, it’s on graveyard shift when it was initially worked on which most of 
our maintenance is done during the night.  But you always have to wonder the 
fatigue factors involved because especially if it happened to be the guy’s Monday.  
Because a lot of mechanics turn around the day shift to be with their families on 
the weekend and when they come in on their Monday, they’re very tired because 
they’ve been up a long time (Participant B). 
The comments provided by the participants offer evidence that a wide range of 
human factors have led to the commission of maintenance errors.  The examples provided 
by the participants identified complacency as the prevalent human factor that can cause 
errors although other examples highlighted lack of attention and lack of awareness as 
contributors.  Of particular interest were the observations and comments made by the 
participants regarding stress and the influence that time demands have on the mechanics 
who perform repairs on aircraft.  Stress imposed on mechanics due to implied or direct 
demands to complete repair work quickly and returned aircraft to service is a 
predominant theme that can contribute to errors during the performance of maintenance. 
Corrective Actions.  Qualitative data gathered from the interview participants 
included information relative to the corrective actions which had been taken by their 
respective air carriers to mitigate the errors and prevent them from re-occurring.  In 
addition, participants were asked to provide information regarding what corrective 
actions they believe should have been taken to address the errors.  Several participants 
noted that their airline took basic corrective action by simply counseling the employees 
who made the errors.  Some of the participants recalled corrective actions that went 
beyond counseling and included manual revisions or system improvements.  Many 
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participants offered suggestions regarding additional actions that could have been taken 
to mitigate the errors.  Descriptions of the corrective actions that were taken and those 
that were suggested are listed categorically with respect to the causal factor to which the 
error applied. 
Corrective action for ineffective or lack of controls.  Corrective action was 
taken to fix the system that tracked and controlled repetitive aircraft inspections to 
prevent aircraft from being operated beyond the dates or flight hours on which additional 
inspections or maintenance actions were due.  The cause of these errors was attributed in 
part to tracking harmonization issues following the merger of the participant’s air carrier 
with another.  Although a system for tracking the due dates was in use, alerts were 
occasional missed which allowed the due dates to be overlooked.  The airline 
implemented a policy change that required manual tracking of the due dates to prevent 
the operation of the aircraft beyond the due dates.  In addition, corrective action was 
taken to lock out or prevent the aircraft from being dispatched for flight.  The success of 
this action was noted as follows:  
We now have the ability to lock the flight plan out to where the Captain cannot 
pull it up until the maintenance has been performed. You’ve got to remember 
each little work group has their own kingdom.  The dispatchers are their own little 
kingdom and everybody else has their own little kingdom and the release of the 
flight plan was Dispatch’s deal. So, for us to be able to put a lock on it and say, 
“You can’t have it.”, they did not want to give up that authority, but the company 




Although the airline’s corrective action reduced the number of instances of 
aircraft that overflew the due dates for certain inspections and maintenance requirements, 
the participant suggested that a more modern approach should have been taken: 
In the world of electronic technology, you think that we would be right up there 
with the best, but we’re back doing things by hand and by paper… Well, I 
personally think that they’ve probably kind of have got somewhat of a handle on 
it with the tracking, tracking it manually.  But again, I think that with today’s 
modern computers and stuff, I think a computer could do it a lot better than we do 
manually (Participant A). 
Corrective action for inaccurate instructions.  Corrective action to address the 
errors caused by policies and procedures that are inadequate, lack sufficient detail, or do 
not contain current information was provided by several participants. 
Inaccurate instructions were the cause of errors committed by mechanics who had 
inspected the elevators of several aircraft incorrectly.  Mechanics had performed the 
inspection using instructions for torquing a bolt and measuring free play to certain 
specifications.  Participant C described the incident which was subsequently attributed to 
incorrect maintenance instructions published by the airline that deviated from the 
manufacturer’s instructions.  The airline acted by notifying its mechanics that the work 
had been performed incorrectly and published a revision to the procedures that matched 
the aircraft manufacturer’s instructions.  However, Participant C believes that action 
should have been taken much earlier had the airline monitored the rejection rate of 
elevators that failed the inspection.  The elevator had a history of failed measurements 
which required removal and further inspection by an outside repair contractor who found 
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no faults when they inspected them using the manufacturer’s instructions.  Had the 
engineers monitored the removals, the error would have been recognized and the cause 
determined much earlier. 
Maintenance instructions that lacked sufficient detail was the causal factor 
regarding a forward lavatory door hinge pin that had migrated through the top of the door 
and protruded through the outer skin of the fuselage.  Participant C noted that it “looked 
like a little antenna, like a three or four-inch antenna” protruding through the fuselage.  
The cause was traced to work instructions that focused inspections on the bottom of the 
door hinge in the belief that migration of the pin would only occur downward due to 
gravity.  Once the error was discovered, the airline revised the work instructions and took 
an additional action to place a kink in the hinge pin of all similar doors to preclude future 
migration.  No additional corrective action was suggested by the participant as it was felt 
this error was unique and the action taken by the airline was sufficient. 
The error related to main landing gear axle damage caused by the removal of a 
wheel and brake assembly and was later released for service after a set of incorrect 
inspection instructions was used to perform the inspection is another example of flawed 
instructions.  Participant D noted that the inspection work card used to inspect the 
damage was discovered to have a non-specific title and this was corrected by the airline.  
In addition, the airline required that new work cards developed over the following year 
had to be reviewed by a mechanic with an A&P certificate or another person in the 
maintenance department who had technical knowledge.  This error was notable as it 
demonstrated the mechanics dependence on work card instructions and the reluctance of 
mechanics to review other aircraft maintenance manuals for references and information.  
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Participant D believes additional action to preclude similar errors should focus on the 
review of work cards, engineering changes, or modification instructions by mechanics 
prior to publication.  Although the airline took action to require new work cards to be 
reviewed for a one-year period, Participant D commented that the person writing the 
instructions “need to have some hands-on technical experience or be working with 
somebody who does, because there’s more that you don’t see” and further added: “an 
engineer that has their A&P is 10 times better than an engineer that doesn’t”.  Creating 
work cards and maintenance instructions with input from line mechanics would ensure 
that the instructions are correct for the repair tasks. 
Participant F also suggested that improvements to the accuracy of maintenance 
instructions are needed and that those who write the instructions should have knowledge 
of the aircraft.  This participant encountered a work card that was incorrect which caused 
a work stoppage until the instructions could be revised.  Although the airline has existing 
procedures which allow work cards to be submitted to the quality department who then 
would contact the engineers who can revise the work cards allowing work to continue, 
this participant commented that a review process should be in place before the 
instructions are published: 
Well, of course, they should have been caught before the paperwork was 
published, but again, engineers are human too.  And really in their defense there 
are a lot of young, and I don't mean any disrespect here but young students that do 
internships with [airline name redacted], they're given tasks like to copy and paste 
instructions on the paperwork, and we were finding this especially during the 
summer, we would get new revisions and a lot of these things would just be 
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copied and pasted and then published.  And I don't know if their reviewing 
process is maybe lacking a little bit or things just slip by because they're human 
too.  But yeah, a lot of these interns would just rewrite these work cards as 
instructed and they would get published.  So, they should have been caught, but 
maybe their controls were lacking a little bit (Participant F). 
Corrective action for failure to follow instructions.  Failure to follow 
maintenance instructions or existing procedures can have a detrimental effect on aircraft 
safety and airworthiness.  Several participants provided descriptions of errors attributed 
to this causal factor and commented on the corrective action that was taken to address the 
errors.  Suggested corrective action measures were also provided. 
The error reported by Participant B that involved the brake anti-skid module 
which was discovered to have its hydraulic lines reversed was initially traced to the 
mechanic who installed it and may not have used the maintenance instructions.  Once the 
initial discrepancy had been reported by the pilots, troubleshooting to identify the 
problem took several mechanics working over multiple shifts to identify and correct it.  
Mechanics attempted different repairs before the root cause was finally identified.  
Corrective action taken by the airline included publication of a newsletter article to alert 
other mechanics of this problem.  While this error with the anti-skid module and the 
hydraulic lines may seem unique, Participant B noted that in his career “there’s been 
hundreds and hundreds of those types of errors”.  The participant suggested that 
continuity during the repair process and documenting the work performed by each shift 
could have reduced the length of time required to troubleshoot the problem.  Continuity 
can be addressed in two ways: the assignment of one person who is given oversight of the 
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problem as it is repaired over multiple shifts would provide a single point of continuity; 
and ensuring that correct turnovers are completed from one shift to another. 
The error involving the scheduling and pre-departure inspection by maintenance 
personnel of an aircraft for an ETOPS flight that was not equipped for such flights 
prompted a comment from Participant A that additional training and awareness could be 
an effective countermeasure against similar error recurrence.  This error was missed by 
several individuals from other departments in addition to the mechanics.  These 
individuals included the aircraft schedulers who assigned the aircraft and the pilots who 
accepted the aircraft and conducted the over-water flight.  The causes were primarily 
attributed to human error as there were existing procedures that if followed, would have 
prevented the error from occurring.  The participant was unaware of any specific actions 
taken by the airline to address the error other than making everyone aware of it and 
asking everyone to slow down and become more observant.  However, Participant A 
suggested that increased awareness by offering additional ETOPS training might have 
helped avoid the error.  This would include reminding the pilots and mechanics to verify 
that the aircraft logbook has the letters ETOPS on its cover as this is a requirement of the 
airline’s ETOPS program and is readily visible to mechanics and crew members who 
must review the logbook before flight. 
The error involving the flight augmentation computers that slid out of their racks 
while in flight due to the failure to secure them in place was an example where 
maintenance instructions were not followed.  Existing policies and maintenance 
requirements were already in place which required the verification that the computers had 
been installed correctly.  Participant A commented that corrective action taken by the 
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airline was focused on counseling the individuals involved with the error.  However, the 
participant indicated that the error may have been influenced by human factors and it was 
suggested that added emphasis should be placed on “the biggest thing, just slow down, 
even if you’re getting pressure, you’ve just got to slow down and make sure you’ve done 
it right” (Participant A). 
Corrective action that would eliminate failures to follow instructions may be more 
difficult to implement particularly for maintenance tasks that are simple or repetitive.  An 
error cited by Participant D involving the failure to properly torque the fasteners 
attaching the wing to fuselage body fairings is an example where specific maintenance 
instructions were not followed due to the nature of the maintenance tasks.  The 
manufacturer had revised the maintenance instructions to include a required torque value 
when installing the screws.  The error was caught by an FAA inspector who observed that 
the screws were being installed using an impact gun at an aircraft overhaul facility 
contracted by the airline to perform maintenance.  Further investigation by the FAA and 
the airline revealed that the screws are not torqued when installed on other similar aircraft 
in its fleet.  The airline took corrective action to verify that the screws were properly 
torqued on approximately 30 aircraft which required re-torquing approximately 100,000 
fasteners.  They also performed an analysis and determined that the installation of 
fasteners using an impact gun without checking the torque would not be a safety risk and 
subsequently revised the language on their work cards to allow installations to be 
conducted without the need for torquing the screws.  However, the causal factors 
whereby the manufacturer’s minor revision to the maintenance instructions had been 
overlooked was not directly addressed by the airline.  The repetitive and simplistic nature 
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of a maintenance task can contribute to complacency by a mechanic with respect to the 
need to read the maintenance manual.  Participant D provided illustrations as to what may 
drive a mechanic to perform simple maintenance tasks without the need to read the 
maintenance instructions: 
Let's say you're troubleshooting something in the cockpit, and you think that it’s a 
light in the overhead is out.  You replace the bulb, and it's not going.  You take 
the voltage and you’re not getting a voltage reading.  You just want to pull that 
panel down and just make sure the wires connected.  You just run the wire there.  
You've done that task 1,000 times.  You know it's four screws and that panel 
drops, but technically there's a maintenance procedure for dropping that panel.  It 
probably says things like make sure the airplane is secure, all this other BS that 
wouldn't really apply to this quick situation.  For that one, it would be dropping an 
overhead, technically the manual says the plane has to be powered down, the 
plane has to be chocked, maintenance personnel can't be around flight controls, 
yada, yada, yada.  For that reference, it's assuming you're going to be doing some 
major work, but if you just want to pull it down to check, to take a reading on a 
wire, if you get a bad inspector and you get caught, they may say, "Hey, where's 
your reference for pulling that down," so a simple task like that.  Now, most 
mechanics, if the inspector came up and said and asked that, they would just lie 
and say, "Yeah, I pulled it up. It's on the computer, and it's shut down now."  If 
the inspector actually pulled it up and started questioning everything, the 
mechanic would just say yes, yes, and yes, because how would the inspector 
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prove he didn't do it?  Most are smart enough for simple things like that to get 
around them (Participant D). 
This participant added that improvements in technology should help mechanics access 
the maintenance instructions which might reduce instances where the instructions may be 
difficult or time consuming to retrieve: 
Things are getting better in terms of access to manuals, I know, because now that 
the FAA is looking at this more and airlines are under more scrutiny to do 
[maintenance] word for word, which I'm kind of in the middle there.  A 
professional mechanic should be able to make some judgments on his own 
without having to be verbatim in a manual.  I'm not saying a mechanic, if it's a 
crack in a spar, probably needs to get an engineer involved at that point or 
probably check a manual, but the things like removing a simple secondary 
structure panel, that's something a mechanic should be able to do without scrutiny 
and without pulling a manual up.  …now is, they're getting more technology-wise.  
I don't know if that's the smaller carriers, but I have on my phone, in my iPad, I 
can pull the manuals up and check.  They even have mechanic specific 
applications, too, so you can pull the manuals up.  It's much more, even more 
clear, than the regular manuals.  There are some things being done to mitigate 
this…but it is a known thing, the OEMs, the airlines, are aware of the time it takes 
to pull data up (Participant D). 
A similar observation regarding how maintenance manuals should be used as a 
corrective action measure to prevent the installation of incorrect parts was noted by 
Participant G.  In this instance, the error involved the installation of bolts that were too 
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long, and which were used to attach anti-ice ducts to the engine nose cowling.  Initially, 
the error was attributed to the listing of incorrect fasteners in the manufacturer’s 
maintenance manual.  The manufacturer corrected this by publishing a revision to the 
manual that identified the correct fasteners.  However, the revision was not noticed by the 
mechanics who continued to replace the bolts with bolts having the same dimension as 
those that were removed.  As explained by the participant: 
[The manufacturer] came out with a revised page, of course, for that manual 
calling out the correct length of bolts and that was something that you had to 
check because a lot of times those things would come in and we'd take them apart 
and we'd have the wrong hardware in them and a lot of guys just put the same 
hardware back in or, for instance, a new bolt but the same length as the old one 
and if you're not reading that manual you would miss that revision and the 
problem isn't solved at all. It's kicked on down the road which isn't a good thing, 
but that could have been a big deal, but fortunately someone caught it.  The 
information was in numerous different places and you had to gather up the 
information on the repairs or the materials from several different places within a 
manual or a series of manuals. A lot of people struggled with that. I did too, and 
it's just the manuals can be very difficult to sort through and pick out the 
information you need, what's important, and what doesn't pertain to it. I think 
that's the biggest factor with manuals, right there, and that leads to people not 
wanting to look at them, but I always read them (Participant G). 
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This participant suggested that the airline should have taken additional corrective action 
to notify the group of mechanics that a revision had been issued to the maintenance 
manual regarding the maintenance of the anti-ice ducts. 
I think, well my company at least I think, could get information out a lot better 
than they did or they probably even still do now.  I think just getting information 
to the shop floor is the most critical thing in that industry, and that's what they 
seem to be not really very good at.  I think there could have been maybe just a 
team meeting about that, because we're all working on that stuff and there was a 
core group of us, and I'm only talking a dozen or 15 people that did this particular 
task, but I don't think it's any big trick to have a quick meeting with 10 or 15 
people and say, hey look, this hardware is wrong and it's in the book now but you 
got to pay attention, make sure you make the change, et cetera, and they don't do 
that.  They just stick it in the book and leave it to you to be responsible for 
looking… I think they could do a better job of getting information out.  There's a 
lot more reasons for it than just that, but I think that's the biggest thing 
(Participant G). 
Although it takes time for mechanics to navigate the manuals in search of instructions 
and replacement parts, this participant also commented that changes in technology may 
lead to changes in behavior that may drive more mechanics to look up the maintenance 
instructions: 
In general, the best thing that happened to prevent that was somewhere along the 
line [it was] putting all the manuals online.  The industry got more computerized 
as time went on, especially 10 years ago or so, but I think the biggest thing that 
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helped was in order to open up those manuals, the individual mechanic had to 
scan his ID card into the computer.  That tells whoever looks at that stuff later 
who was in that computer and looking at what at a given time.  If something were 
to happen later, they can pull up that record and see if you actually opened up that 
manual or not, so that gave you incentive to open up that manual every day, as far 
as I'm concerned.  I think, I mean, working for corporate America has kind of got 
a certain nastiness to it, but that's just the way the game is.... it feels like a lot of 
times you're being spied on electronically.  But really, I think that was a real help 
because that tells a guy, well, I better be on record as having opened-up this 
manual because in the old days with books nobody knew who opened the book 
and who didn't.  There's no way to keep track, but there certainly is now.  If you 
scan your timecard in a card reader to open up the overhaul manual, then there's a 
record of it right there.  That gives you incentive (Participant G) 
Most of the participants noted that with some exceptions, air carriers took 
immediate action to correct the errors noted by the participants.  Mechanics were 
counseled, maintenance instructions and work cards were revised, and newsletter articles 
and bulletins were issued.  However, several of the participants had similar concerns that 
failure to follow maintenance instructions are related to human factors such as 
complacency due to the performance of repetitive or simple tasks.  Technological 
improvements were identified by several participants as a partial solution that will 
provide mechanics with ease of access to the maintenance instructions.  The ability for an 
airline to identify the identity of mechanics who access the manuals may provide an 
incentive for those that wish to be on record as having reviewed the manuals.  Although 
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these steps may help reduce the number of instances where instructions were not 
accessed during maintenance, they may not eliminate errors committed by mechanics 
who rely on their knowledge and experience to perform repetitive or simple maintenance 







SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS & RECOMMENDATIONS 
This mixed-method study gathered quantitative data from 48 participants who 
completed a survey and qualitative date from nine of the participants who were 
interviewed.   The combination of the quantitative data and the qualitative data achieved 
what Patton (2015) had described as “placing flesh on the bones” when compared to 
studies that rely solely on quantitative data (p.230).  The survey results identified that 
certain maintenance errors were observed at a higher frequency than others.  Survey data 
regarding the causal factors that drove the commission of the errors found two of the six 
causal factors were observed by the participants to have a higher frequency of 
occurrence.  However, analysis of the qualitative data provided as comments by survey 
participants and qualitative data provided by participants that were interviewed found 
several common threads that further defined certain errors and causal factors which 
should be of concern to U.S. major air carriers and professionals in the aviation 
maintenance industry. 
This chapter summaries the research conducted for this study and offers 
conclusions with respect to the research questions that were proposed.  Additional 
observations which were not anticipated prior to the commencement of this study are also  
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noted.  This chapter concludes with recommendations offered for further consideration 
and research. 
Summary 
Maintenance errors within the airline industry have been associated with aircraft 
accidents such as the crash of an American Airlines DC10 in 1979, the crash of a Japan 
Air Lines 747 in 1985, the loss of a cockpit windshield on a BAC1-11 in 1990, and the 
in-flight break-up of an Embraer 120 in 1991 (Reason & Hobbs, 2003).  Maintenance 
errors have been shown to have played a role in 26 percent of aircraft accidents (Liang et 
al., 2010).  A study of human error found that this is responsible for 70 to 80 percent of 
aviation accidents and of these, 15 to 20 percent were related to maintenance activities 
(Chiu & Hsieh, 2016; Erjavac, et al., 2018). 
Proactive measures to determine the cause of errors was taken by the Boeing 
Company who introduced its Maintenance Error and Decision Aid (MEDA) system that 
identified the top ten causes of maintenance errors (Boeing, 2013).  Boeing acknowledges 
that maintenance errors can be caused by several factors and that management personnel 
have the ability to control or prevent over 80 percent of these factors (Boeing, 2013).  
Reason and Hobbs (2003) noted that maintenance errors can be initiated in one of two 
ways: maintenance personnel may fail to identify a problem or repair it properly, or; 
maintenance personnel may undertake an action that leads to a failure which would not 
otherwise have occurred.  Other studies have shown that failure to follow written 
procedures or deviating from those procedures can cause errors (Drury, 1998; Eiff & 
Suckow, 2008; Lattanzio et al., 2008).  Maintenance instructions that contain inaccurate 
or missing information are another casual factor that can lead to the commission of errors 
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(Lattanzio, et al., 2008).  A focused study of an airline over a two-year period found that 
failure to use or follow maintenance instructions was caused by complacency which 
occurred due to the repetitive and monotonous nature of the maintenance tasks (Liang et 
al., 2010). 
To identify the common errors and causal factors that may exist among the top 
four major U.S. air carriers, Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests were sent to 
the FAA that asked for FAA compliance action letters issued to American Airlines, Delta 
Air Lines, Southwest Airlines, and United Airlines for the FAA’s 2018 fiscal year.  The 
requests resulted in the acquisition of 87 compliance action letters for American Airlines, 
93 compliance actions letters for Southwest Airlines, and 14 compliance action letters for 
United Airlines.  The FAA did not provide compliance action letters for Delta Air Lines 
claiming that they have a memorandum of understanding with Delta that allows 
compliance activities to be driven into that air carrier’s voluntary disclosure program thus 
preventing the release of the documents (FAA response letter, July 9th, 2019).  This 
response was appealed in accordance with FOIA procedures and has yet to be resolved.  
Initial research to identify common maintenance errors and casual factors was limited to 
the review of compliance action letters for the remaining three air carriers. 
Analysis of the FAA compliance action letters noted that of the total received, 75 
letters issued to American Airlines, 49 letters issued to Southwest Airlines, and 4 letters 
issued to United Airlines were maintenance related.  Further analysis noted that errors 
observed by the FAA fell into 12 categories with one of those categories identified as 
general in nature.  Causal factors reported in the FAA compliance action closure letters 
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were observed to fall into six distinct categories along with four categories for human 
factors.  The top errors noted in the FAA compliance action letters were: 
• Errors observed with maintenance entries (93 instances) 
• Errors observed where deviations were made from instructions (58 instances) 
• Errors observed where maintenance tasks were not performed (44 instances) 
• Errors with the maintenance instructions (28 instances) 
The top causal factors noted in the FAA compliance action closure letters were: 
• Failure to follow instructions (92 instances) 
• Failure to make correct maintenance entries (89 instances) 
• Inaccurate or incomplete maintenance instructions (29 instances) 
The top human factors noted in the FAA compliance action closure letters were: 
• Lack of Awareness (8 instances) 
• Complacency (7 instances) 
The categories identified for errors, causal factors, and human factors from the 
analysis of the FAA compliance action letters were used to develop the survey instrument 
to gather quantitative data for the first phase of this study.  The survey collected 
quantitative data from 48 participants who indicated that they were involved with 
maintenance on aircraft operated by U.S. air carriers that have more than 70 seats.  The 
survey results were supplemented with qualitative data submitted by participants who 
provided additional commentary in their responses to the three open-text survey 
questions.  Qualitative data was also obtained from the second phase of the study which 
involved interviews of nine participants using a list of semi-structured questions.  The 
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combined data from the survey and interviews was used to answer the three research 
questions. 
Conclusions 
Three research questions were proposed which are addressed by the findings 
generated by this study.  The results of this study also provided additional observations 
that had not been anticipated. 
First research question.  The first research question asked: What errors are 
common to maintenance performed on aircraft operated by major U.S. air carriers 
certificated under FAR Part 121? 
The results of this study produced mixed results that made it difficult to single out 
one single category of error over another as the most common.  However, certain error 
categories were reported by survey participants to have a higher frequency of occurrence 
whereas other error categories appeared more dominant in the descriptions of 
maintenance errors provided by participants as commentary in the surveys. 
Quantitative data found that of the eleven types of errors listed on the survey, 
three had been observed by participants more frequently than the others.  These errors 
were identified as: 
• Errors observed with the completion of maintenance entries 
• Errors observed with the handling of maintenance documents, records tags, 
forms, or placards 
• Errors with the content of maintenance instructions 
Commentary provided by participants in the survey focused attention on two additional 
error categories identified as: 
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• Errors regarding maintenance steps or tasks performed that deviate from 
written instructions or procedures 
• Errors regarding maintenance steps or tasks that were overlooked or not 
performed 
In contrast, the qualitative data gathered from individual participant interviews found that 
the following error categories dominated the discussions from high to low: 
• Errors related to the installation of parts 
• Errors related to the storage of parts and materials 
• Errors regarding deviation from instructions or procedures 
• Errors related to steps or tasks not performed or overlooked 
• Errors related to the content of maintenance instructions 
• Errors related to the scheduling/control of the maintenance process 
• Errors with the completion of maintenance entries 
Comparison of the data acquired from the survey with the data acquired from the 
participant interviews found commonality with three types of errors: 
• Errors observed with the completion of maintenance entries 
• Errors regarding the deviation from instructions or procedures 
• Errors related to steps or tasks not performed or overlooked 
The common errors identified by this research compare directly with the common 
errors previously identified during the review of the FAA compliance action letters.  The 
review of the FAA compliance action letters found that 86 errors related to maintenance 
entries, 37 errors involving deviation from maintenance instructions and 31 errors were 
related to tasks that were not performed.  The high number of errors related to incorrect 
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maintenance entries noted by the FAA agrees with the higher frequency of similar errors 
reported by the survey participants.  Similarly, the higher number of errors noted by the 
FAA regarding deviations from maintenance instructions and errors related to tasks not 
performed or overlooked agree with the higher incidence of errors reported by the 
interview participants. 
The largest anomaly noted was the category related to errors observed with the 
handling of maintenance documents, records tags, forms, or placards.  Survey 
participants noted that such errors occur at a relatively higher frequency than all other 
errors which agree with the FAA data.  However, participants that were interviewed did 
not provide examples of errors that could be directly associated with this category.  It is 
possible that this type of error may not have been viewed as significant compared to other 
errors described by the participants who were interviewed. 
Second research question.  The second research questions asked: Why are these 
maintenance errors committed? 
Analysis of the quantitative data gathered from the survey together with the 
qualitative data collected from the interviews identified several causal factors and human 
factors that are dominant over others.  With the exception of the low frequency of 
observations for the causal factor related to ineffective controls over the maintenance 
process, the remaining five causal factors were found to have almost identical frequency 
levels.  However, additional qualitative data obtained from written comments submitted 
with the survey noted the importance and severity of two causal factors when compared 
to the remainder.  These two causal factors are: 
• Failure to follow instructions or procedural requirements 
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• Maintenance and process instructions that contain inaccurate information or 
lacked sufficient detail 
The results from the survey correlate with the qualitative data obtained from the 
participants who were interviewed.  These participants provided 11 instances where they 
believe that inaccurate or incomplete maintenance instructions were responsible for 
maintenance errors.  This was followed closely by nine instances where the participants 
recalled errors caused by failure to follow instructions or procedural requirements. 
Comparison of theses causal factors with those identified during the initial 
research that examined FAA compliance action documents found that there is also 
correlation.  The FAA compliance action closure letters found that failure to follow 
instructions and instructions that contained inaccurate or incomplete information were 
primary maintenance error causal factors.  The FAA data also identified the failure to 
make maintenance entries or omission of entries as a common causal factor.  However, 
the survey results and interview data do not suggest that this is a predominant causal 
factor.  It is possible that the FAA may identify this more frequently during their 
inspections and reviews of air carrier maintenance records than the participants who may 
spend the majority of their time physically working on aircraft. 
Failure to follow instructions and maintenance instructions that contain inaccurate 
information or lack sufficient detail are issues that have been previously identified by 
others as major causal factors of maintenance errors.  Boeing’s Maintenance Error and 
Decision Aid (MEDA) system listed the failure to follow published technical data as the 
highest contributor to maintenance errors (Boeing, 2013).  Manufacturer’s documentation 
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that contained errors within the maintenance instructions was noted to be a leading cause 
of maintenance errors in an FAA sponsored study (Lattanzio, et al., 2008). 
The identification of common causal factors also included an analysis of human 
factors that cause maintenance errors.  Four human factors were included in the survey 
and the responses verified that all four were causal factors for maintenance errors.  
However, two of the human factors were observed by the survey participants at a higher 
frequency.  These were identified as: 
• Complacency 
• Lack of Attention 
Qualitative data from both the survey comments and interviews found that these two 
human factors were also of great significance.  Of the two, complacency was established 
as the leading human factor that contributed to the commission of errors.  This agrees 
with another study conducted of an airline over a two-year period that identified 
complacency as the cause of maintenance errors (Liang et al., 2010).  
A causal factor that was not anticipated by this study was the impact of stress on 
complacency.  As explained by several participants, the demand to return aircraft to 
service quickly, either implied or directed by supervision, can drive mechanics to take 
short cuts and avoid accessing the maintenance manuals.  This happens frequently with 
simple or repetitive tasks that are familiar to mechanics who believe that they can 
complete the tasks without the need to retrieve the manuals instructions.  Coupled with 
the perception that anyone looking up maintenance instructions may be doing so to slow 
the repair process, mechanics may avoid using the maintenance manuals.  Of the causal 
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factors identified by this study, failure to follow instructions or procedural requirements 
due to complacency and the need to return the aircraft to service is of the highest concern. 
Third research question.  The third research question asked: What actions have 
been or could be instituted to prevent the commission of maintenance errors on aircraft 
operated by major U.S. air carriers? 
This study relied on qualitative data obtained from interviewed participants who 
were asked to identify successful corrective action measures that had been taken by their 
air carrier to mitigate errors.  They were also asked to comment on corrective actions that 
they believe should also be taken to prevent errors.  The participants noted that most of 
the corrective actions taken by the air carriers involved actions specific to mitigating the 
error that had been identified.  Such actions included counseling of mechanics who made 
the errors, correcting the errors by replacing components or repairing damage, issuing 
training bulletins, and in some instances revising maintenance instructions to either 
clarify existing instructions or to add instructions that qualify any deviations that may 
have been taken.  With few exceptions, most corrective actions taken by the air carriers 
were localized to that error and not universal in coverage.  Corrective actions that were 
deemed effective by the participants are noted below along with some of their 
suggestions for improvement: 
Ineffective or lack of controls: 
Action taken: To prevent aircraft from operating beyond the required inspection 
due dates or flight hours while in service, controls were established 
by the airline to lock-out the issuance of flight plans and prevent 
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the dispatch of aircraft until required maintenance work was 
accomplished and validated.  
Suggested action: Automate all maintenance scheduling and other record keeping 
processes to eliminate the manual scheduling and tracking of 
aircraft in service. 
Inadequate or inaccurate instructions: 
Action taken: Action was taken to implement a one-year plan that required a 
review of all new work cards by a technical team to ensure 
accuracy before the cards and instructions are published. 
Suggested actions: All maintenance instructions and revisions should be written by 
experienced engineers working in harmony with mechanics to 
develop instructions that are both accurate and match the work 
performed by mechanics to maintain the aircraft.  Individual 
manuals, parts catalogs, and maintenance instructions should be 
combined into one source or database to eliminate the need for a 
mechanic to retrieve information from separate manuals.  
Maintenance personnel should also be briefed on revisions to 
maintenance instructions that are applicable to their work area at 
the time the revisions are published to avoid instances where 
revisions may be overlooked. 
Failure to follow instructions: 
Actions taken: Action was taken to establish electronic databases containing 
maintenance instructions that are revised and updated so that the 
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information is never older than 24 hours.  The information can also 
be accessed by mechanics on portable devices such as tablets and 
smartphones.  
Suggested action: Several participants acknowledged that failure to follow 
instructions is a key causal factor that can be attributed to 
complacency, which is driven in part by the performance of 
repetitive or simple maintenance tasks and expectations to quickly 
return the aircraft to service.  While specific actions related to 
these factors were not provided, one participant suggested that it 
may help if better training was adopted for new mechanics to 
instill good habits rather than having new mechanics trained to 
follow bad habits handed down by senior mechanics.  Another 
participant suggested that there should be level at which a 
professional mechanic could make a judgement regarding the 
performance of simple tasks without the requirement for specific 
instructions.  Several participants acknowledged that efforts are 
already underway in the industry to provide maintenance 
instructions electronically and available on personal electronic 
devices. 
Additional Observations.  While this study focused on the quantitative and 
qualitative data gathered from the survey and participant interviews, two observations 




The information provided by the FAA in response to the researcher’s FOIA 
requests for FAA compliance action letters did not include any letters that had been 
issued to Delta Air Lines.  Delta’s FAA CMO stated that they have a memorandum of 
understanding with Delta that drives all compliance activities into Delta’s voluntary 
disclosure program.  This action may not be in accordance with FAA procedures and 
appears to be in conflict with FAA oversight activities of the other three air carriers.  An 
appeal was lodged asking for the documents to be released noting that FAA guidance 
material has restrictions that do not allow the FAA to place all FAA discovered errors 
into an airline’s voluntary disclosure program.  No information has been received 
regarding the status of the appeal and as a result, this study did not include a review of 
FAA compliance actions that may exist regarding maintenance errors found at Delta Air 
Lines. 
A second observation was noted with the identification of the sample population.  
This study assumed that the records maintained and updated by the FAA were current 
and the information and addresses for the mechanics was correct in the database.  
However, of the 1000 survey requests that were sent to mechanics who were randomly 
selected from the sample population, 128 survey request letters were returned as 
undeliverable.  This represents a database error of 12.8 percent which was not expected.  
Other than reduce the number of survey respondents, this observation does not directly 
affect the study but is indicative of a database error within the FAA that may require 






Four recommendations are offered based on the results of this study: 
1. One of the key findings of this study involved issues where mechanics failed to 
follow instructions or procedural requirements.  Participants in this study noted 
that this happens particularly if the tasks are simple or repetitive.  Others 
mentioned that this can happen due to implied or direct supervisory demands that 
the aircraft be returned to service as soon as possible.  While this study identified 
these factors, it did not explore these causal elements further nor did it analyze at 
what skill level it would be acceptable for mechanics to perform work without 
referring to maintenance instructions.  Further study is recommended to examine 
situations involving the performance of simple or repetitive tasks and the causal 
factors that may drive mechanics to perform maintenance without referencing the 
maintenance instructions. 
2. The study identified issues with maintenance instructions that contained 
inaccurate information or lacked detail.  Interview participants noted that these 
types of errors frequently appear on work cards published by the air carriers.  
Causal factors related to the lack of knowledge and experience of the work card 
authors was cited by the participants as a dominant issue.  Suggestions for 
corrective action included the pairing of mechanics with engineers and other work 
card authors to validate the instructions prior to publication.  While the suggestion 
has merit, this study did not explore the effectiveness of the corrective action and 
further study is recommended to determine if this action will eliminate many of 
the errors associated with the maintenance instructions. 
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3. This study was limited in scope to the 48 participants who responded to the 
survey request and met the criteria for inclusion in the study.  This number was 
too small to perform a pure quantitative study where results could be measured 
for hypothesis testing at high confidence levels.  While this researcher believes 
that qualitative study offers deeper insights into situational settings, additional 
quantitative statistics and hypothesis testing may be possible if a larger number of 
participants could be obtained from the population sample.  It is recommended 
that further quantitative research be undertaken and expanded to include a greater 
number of participants that would allow for greater statistical analysis. 
4. The FAA database that identifies individuals who hold non-airmen FAA 
certificates such as those issued to mechanics should be the focus of additional 
research.  This study unexpectedly found that over 12 percent of the mechanics 
selected for participation in this study could not be contacted at the address of 
record.  It is recommended that further research be undertaken to identify the 
extent the database information is incorrect, the causal factors that drove the 
errors, and identify what actions can be taken to ensure that the database reflects 
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To the best of your knowledge and personal experience, please answer the following statements by 
indicating the frequency that you have observed the following types of aircraft maintenance errors in your 
workplace. Please circle only one answer for each question. 
 
1. I have seen errors occur with respect to the storage of aircraft parts and materials. 
 
1. Never 2. Rarely 3. Sometimes 4. Regularly 5. Often 6. Prefer not to respond 
 
2. I have seen errors with the content of maintenance instructions. 
 
1. Never 2. Rarely 3. Sometimes 4. Regularly 5. Often 6. Prefer not to respond 
 
3. I have seen errors occur with the scheduling and/or control of the maintenance process. 
 
1. Never 2. Rarely 3. Sometimes 4. Regularly 5. Often 6. Prefer not to respond 
 
4. I have seen errors occur with the handling of maintenance documents, records, tags, forms, or placards. 
 
1. Never 2. Rarely 3. Sometimes 4. Regularly 5. Often 6. Prefer not to respond. 
 
5. I have seen errors occur with the installation of parts or equipment. 
 
1. Never 2. Rarely 3. Sometimes 4. Regularly 5. Often 6. Prefer not to respond 
 
6. I have seen errors occur with the completion of maintenance entries. 
 
1. Never 2. Rarely 3. Sometimes 4. Regularly 5. Often 6. Prefer not to respond 
 
7. I have seen maintenance steps or tasks performed using procedures that are not accepted or approved 
by the FAA. 
 
1. Never 2. Rarely 3. Sometimes 4. Regularly 5. Often 6. Prefer not to respond 
 
Survey – Identification of Aircraft Maintenance 




8. I have seen maintenance steps or tasks performed that deviate from written instructions or procedures. 
 
1. Never 2. Rarely 3. Sometimes 4. Regularly 5. Often 6. Prefer not to respond 
 
9. I have seen maintenance steps or tasks that were overlooked or not performed. 
 
1. Never 2. Rarely 3. Sometimes 4. Regularly 5. Often 6. Prefer not to respond 
 
10. I have seen errors occur with the handling, usage, or control of calibrated tools and equipment. 
 
1. Never 2. Rarely 3. Sometimes 4. Regularly 5. Often 6. Prefer not to respond 
 
11. I have seen errors occur with training requirements, recurrent training, or maintaining of qualifications 
for those assigned to perform maintenance. 
 
1. Never 2. Rarely 3. Sometimes 4. Regularly 5. Often 6. Prefer not to respond 
 
12. In the space below, please list any other types of maintenance errors you may have observed that are 
not mentioned above and indicate how likely you feel that these errors occur during the performance of 
maintenance. (Response is optional) 
 
         
 
         
 
         
 
         
 
         
 
         
 
         
 
         
 
         
 




This next section is focused on the cause of maintenance errors.  To the best of your knowledge and 
personal experience, please indicate the frequency that the listed cause is responsible for errors that 
have been committed in your aircraft maintenance workplace.  Please circle only one answer for each 
question. 
 
13. Policies and procedures that are inadequate, lack sufficient detail, or do not contain current information 
cause maintenance errors in my workplace. 
 





14. Failure to follow maintenance instructions or procedural requirements cause maintenance errors in my 
work place. 
 
1. Never 2. Rarely 3. Sometimes 4. Regularly 5. Often 6. Prefer not to respond 
 
15. Ineffective controls over the maintenance process or the lack of a measurement process cause 
maintenance errors in my work place. 
 
1. Never 2. Rarely 3. Sometimes 4. Regularly 5. Often 6. Prefer not to respond 
 
16. Maintenance and process instructions that contain inaccurate information or lacked sufficient detail 
cause maintenance errors in my work place. 
 
1. Never 2. Rarely 3. Sometimes 4. Regularly 5. Often 6. Prefer not to respond 
 
17. Maintenance personnel lacking sufficient training or knowledge cause maintenance errors in my work 
place. 
 
1. Never 2. Rarely 3. Sometimes 4. Regularly 5. Often 6. Prefer not to respond 
 
18. Failure to make maintenance entries or omitting relevant information in logbooks, maintenance 
records, or other record keeping documents cause maintenance errors in my work place. 
 
1. Never 2. Rarely 3. Sometimes 4. Regularly 5. Often 6. Prefer not to respond 
 
19. In the space below, please list any other causes not mentioned above that you believe are responsible 
for maintenance errors in your workplace and indicate how likely you feel that they contributed to the 
commission of the maintenance errors. (Response is optional) 
 
         
 
         
 
         
 
         
 
         
 
         
 
         
 




To the best of your knowledge and personal experience, please respond to the following statements by 
indicating the frequency that each listed human factor has caused or contributed to errors in your 
workplace.  Please circle only one answer for each question. 
 
20. Lack of awareness cause maintenance errors in my workplace. 
 





21. Complacency cause maintenance errors in my workplace. 
 
1. Never 2. Rarely 3. Sometimes 4. Regularly 5. Often 6. Prefer not to respond 
 
22. Distractions cause maintenance errors in my workplace. 
 
1. Never 2. Rarely 3. Sometimes 4. Regularly 5. Often 6. Prefer not to respond 
 
23. Lack of attention cause maintenance errors in my workplace. 
 
1. Never 2. Rarely 3. Sometimes 4. Regularly 5. Often 6. Prefer not to respond 
 
24. In the space below, please list any other human factors not mentioned above that you believe caused or 
contributed to maintenance errors in your work place and indicate how likely you feel that they 
contributed to the maintenance errors. (Response is optional) 
 
         
 
         
 
         
 
         
 
         
 
         
 
         
 
         
 
         
 




The last few questions are general demographic questions.  Please circle only one answer for each 
question. 
 









26. Please select the category of aviation in which you are primarily involved with the performance of 
aircraft maintenance functions: 
 
a. General aviation 
b. Corporate Aviation 
c. Air Taxi and commuter aviation (unscheduled passenger services using aircraft 
with 19 seats or less) 
d. Regional airlines (scheduled passenger services using aircraft with 70 passenger 
seats or less) 
e. Major airlines (scheduled passenger services using aircraft with more than 70 
seats) 
f. Cargo carrier 
g. Other (Please indicate in text box) 
h. None 
i. Prefer not to respond 
 
27. Please indicate how many years of experience you have with aircraft maintenance activities by 
selecting one of the following: 
 
a. No experience 
b. Up to 2 years’ experience 
c. 2 years but less than 5 years’ experience 
d. 5 years’ but less than 10 years’ experience 
e. 10 years’ but less than 20 years’ experience 
f. Greater than 20 years’ experience 




Semi-Structured Interview Questions 
 
Note: This list of questions can be repeated as necessary to capture information on 
several different errors known to the participant.  The intent of the interview is to gather 
more qualitative information specific to each maintenance error that is discussed.  
Participants can state that they prefer to not respond to any of the questions listed below. 
 
1. With respect to errors or incidents resulting from the commission of errors, please 
describe a maintenance error that occurred within the past 2 to 4 years and which you 
may have seen or have first-hand knowledge that affected you or another co-worker. 
a. Describe the maintenance action or task that was being performed? 
b. Where did this take place? 
c. When did this take place? 
d. What were the working conditions present at the time the task was performed? 
e. What were the sequence of tasks that were performed? 
f. If more than one person was performing the task, what responsibilities and tasks 
were performed by each of the team members? 
g. Was the maintenance task one that is considered a routine (repetitive) task? 
h. At what point in the process was the error initially identified? 
 
2. With respect to this error or mistake, in your opinion what do you believe were the 
contributing factors that led to the error? 
a. What were the outside factors that contributed to the error? 
b. Describe the human factors that contributed to the error? 
 
3. Describe action that was taken at your work place to prevent this error from 
happening again? 
 
4. To the best of your knowledge, describe similar occurrences of this error at your work 
place? 
 





Survey Internal Consistency Measurements 
 




Cronbach's Alpha Based on 
Standardized Items N of Items 
   
.915 .917 21 
   
 





Cronbach's Alpha Based on 
Standardized Items N of Items 
   
.869 .868 11 
   
 
Cronbach’s Alpha calculated for the 10 questions focused 




Cronbach's Alpha Based on 
Standardized Items N of Items 
   
.839 .848 10 


























Alpha if Item 
Deleted 
      
Parts and materials errors 54.58 112.249 .434 .528 .914 
      
Maintenance instruction errors 54.36 108.325 .675 .823 .908 
      
Scheduling and/or Control of the 
maintenance process. 54.71 110.574 .546 .653 .911 
      
Maintenance documents, records, tags, 
forms, or placards errors 54.31 111.037 .531 .688 .912 
      
Installation of parts or equipment errors 54.91 113.537 .501 .606 .912 
      
Completion of maintenance entry errors 54.27 113.336 .427 .706 .914 
      
Use of procedures that are not accepted or 
approved by the FAA 55.40 111.018 .596 .689 .910 
      
Deviation from written instructions or 
procedures. 55.13 111.345 .601 .658 .910 
      
Maintenance steps or tasks that were 
overlooked or not performed 55.16 107.362 .772 .698 .906 
      
Handling, usage, or control of calibrated 
tools and equipment errors 55.42 112.340 .499 .600 .912 
      
Training requirements, recurrent training, 
or maintaining of qualifications errors 55.11 104.692 .761 .780 .906 
      
Policies and procedure issues cause errors 54.98 108.522 .661 .737 .909 
      
Failure to follow instructions or 
procedures cause errors 54.91 113.719 .407 .697 .914 
      
Ineffective controls over the maintenance 
process cause errors 55.22 109.040 .677 .671 .908 
      
Maintenance and process instructions that 
contain inaccurate information or lacked 
detail cause errors 
55.02 108.295 .551 .756 .912 
      
Maintenance personnel lacking sufficient 
training or knowledge cause errors 54.78 108.177 .534 .660 .912 
      
Failure to make maintenance entries or 
omitting relevant information in records 
cause errors 
55.02 112.204 .398 .509 .915 
      
Lack of awareness cause errors 54.89 113.465 .443 .751 .913 
      
Complacency cause errors 54.44 109.616 .606 .709 .910 
      
Distractions cause errors 54.69 112.765 .621 .564 .910 
      
Lack of attention cause errors 54.69 112.856 .548 .705 .911 






















Alpha if Item 
Deleted 
      
Parts and materials errors 27.20 32.605 .432 .313 .868 
      
Maintenance instruction errors 26.98 30.911 .633 .478 .853 
      
Scheduling and/or Control of the 
maintenance process. 27.26 31.219 .569 .439 .858 
      
Maintenance documents, records, tags, 
forms, or placards errors 26.89 31.388 .602 .466 .855 
      
Installation of parts or equipment errors 27.52 33.322 .515 .423 .861 
      
Completion of maintenance entry errors 26.87 32.516 .514 .544 .861 
      
Use of procedures that are not accepted or 
approved by the FAA 28.02 32.822 .495 .560 .862 
      
Deviation from written instructions or 
procedures. 27.72 33.007 .510 .515 .861 
      
Maintenance steps or tasks that were 
overlooked or not performed 27.76 30.408 .748 .636 .845 
      
Handling, usage, or control of calibrated 
tools and equipment errors 28.04 32.531 .514 .449 .861 
      
Training requirements, recurrent training, 
or maintaining of qualifications errors 27.70 29.105 .725 .661 .845 






















Alpha if Item 
Deleted 
      
Policies and procedure issues cause errors 24.63 25.305 .598 .552 .817 
      
Failure to follow instructions or procedures 
cause errors  26.873 .453 .490 .831 
      
Ineffective controls over the maintenance 
process cause errors 24.87 25.760 .589 .486 .819 
      
Maintenance and process instructions that 
contain inaccurate information or lacked 
detail cause errors 
24.65 25.165 .489 .673 .830 
      
Maintenance personnel lacking sufficient 
training or knowledge cause errors 24.46 24.298 .533 .559 .826 
      
Failure to make maintenance entries or 
omitting relevant information in records 
cause errors 
24.67 26.758 .361 .208 .842 
      
Lack of awareness cause errors 24.54 26.254 .561 .546 .822 
      
Complacency cause errors 24.11 24.499 .697 .602 .808 
      
Distractions cause errors 24.33 27.158 .588 .416 .822 
      
Lack of attention cause errors 24.33 26.714 .585 .537 .821 
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